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THE TELLTALE SIGN OF DISCRIMINATION:
PROBABILITIES, INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES,
AND THE SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT THEORY
Jason R. Bent*
The systemic disparate treatment theory of employment discrimination is in disar-
ray. Originally formulated in United States v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, the systemic disparate treatment theory provides plaintiffs with a meth-
od for creating an inference of unlawful discriminatory intent if plaintiffs can
first present sufficient statistical evidence establishing that the employer was en-
gaged in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. While the Court and scholars
have recently given substantial attention to the disparate impact theory, they have
not adequately analyzed the contours of the systemic disparate treatment theory.
For example, there are currently disputes about whether the systemic disparate
treatment theory can be utilized by plaintiffs in (1) ADEA cases, (2) ADA cases,
(3) hostile work environment cases, and (4) private individual (non-class) dis-
crimination cases brought under any of the antidiscrimination statutes. The
development of a coherent approach to systemic disparate treatment law is becom-
ing increasingly important. Since 2006, the EEOC has made pursuit of its
"Systemic Initiative" a top priority in its enforcement strategy. Thus, difficult ques-
tions about the application of the systemic disparate treatment theory will continue
to surface.
This Article takes a first step toward bringing order to the systemic disparate
treatment theory. Drawing upon economic models of optimal allocation of burdens
of proof in civil litigation and an application of Bayesian probability analysis,
this Article argues that the proper extent of the systemic disparate treatment theory
depends on three critical considerations: (1) the background prevalence (or prior
probability) of the type of discrimination alleged; (2) the relative strength of the ev-
identiary signal provided by the proffered statistical evidence; and (3) the parties'
relative access to evidence on the element of discriminatory intent. Applying the
principles developed here, this Article concludes that the Teamsters systemic dis-
parate treatment theory should be available as a method of proof for plaintiffs in
ADEA, ADA, and individual (non-class) cases, but not in hostile work environ-
ment cases.
* Attorney, Smith & Bent, P.C.; Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College
of Law (Appointment commencing Fall 2011); J.D., University of Michigan (2000). An earli-
er version of this paper was presented at the Seton Hall Law School Fourth Annual
Employment and Labor Law Scholars Forum, on January 22-23, 2010. I am grateful for the
many helpful suggestions offered by the Forum participants, including Roberto Corrada,
Timothy P. Glynn, Tristin K. Green, Charles A. Sullivan, Susan P. Sturm, Rebecca Hanner
White, Michael J. Zimmer, Charlotte Garden, Stephen Rich, and Hina B. Shah, as well as
valuable comments received from the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall, Shaina Bent, Ramona
L. Paetzold, J.J. Prescott, Michael Shapiro, Michael D. Smith, Steven L. Willborn, and Robert
Vischer.
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"Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case
such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of
purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in
a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic compo-
sition of the population in the community from which employees are
hired. "'
The systemic disparate treatment theory may soon reclaim cen-
ter stage in employment discrimination law. Until very recently, the
disparate impact theory of discrimination received all the atten-
tion. The Supreme Court considered the legality of employer
actions meant to avoid disparate impact liability in the high-profile
Ricci v. DeStefano case.2 Scholars and jurists have likewise noted and
analyzed potential tension between the disparate impact theory
and the Constitutional requirement of equal protection.' Because
the disparate impact doctrine raises politically volatile issues in-
cluding the use of racial quotas, testing biases, and affirmative
action, it has been a source of controversy since its inception.
1. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340, n.20 (1977). A leading
treatise on employment discrimination adds: "The converse of this is that a substantial de-
parture from what is expected, absent discrimination, is so improbable that the trier of fact
should conclude, at least prima facie, that discrimination explains the disparity." 1 CHARLES
A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.04[A], at 175
(3rd ed. 2002).
2. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (considering whether a public em-
ployer could disregard test scores and decline to make promotions, out of concern for a
potential disparate impact problem, without running afoul of Title VII's prohibition on
disparate treatment); Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another
Turn on the Disparate Impact Road, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 201 (2009) (contending that Ricci
represents only the latest salvo in an ongoing battle between Congress and the Supreme
Court on the disparate impact theory).
3. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion
in full, but write separately to observe that its resolution of this dispute merely postpones the
evil day on which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent,
are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with
the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection?"); Richard A. Primus, The Future of Dispar-
ate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003). The Supreme Court has also recently
heard a number of cases involving more peripheral issues relating to disparate impact liabil-
ity. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010) (considering the timeliness of
discrimination charges in a disparate impact case involving the repeated-use of test scores in
making municipal hiring decisions over a number of years); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2401-02 (2008) (determining the appropriate allocation of the
burdens of proof for the affirmative defenses to disparate impact claims under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) ("ADEA")); Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (determining that the disparate impact theory is
available to plaintiffs under the ADEA).
4. The disparate impact theory was first articulated by the Court in Griggs v. DukePow-
er Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and has been one of the most controversial aspects of
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But the Supreme Court's decision in the Wal-Mart v. Dukes case
in June 2011 has the potential to revive interest in the disparate
impact theory's cousin-the systemic disparate treatment theory-
which implicates many of the same issues in a different theoretical
setting. While attention was focused on the disparate impact theo-
ry, a number of disputes were brewing in the lower courts
regarding the proper interpretation, extent, and application of the
systemic disparate treatment theory. These issues demonstrate
fundamental disagreements and misunderstandings at the core of
systemic disparate treatment law. This Article will take a first step
toward bringing order to the systemic disparate treatment theory.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the Su-
preme Court articulated a theory for systemic disparate treatment.
In basic terms, the systemic disparate treatment theory provides
that if the plaintiff(s) can establish that an employer engaged in a
"pattern or practice" of disparate treatment discrimination in the
first phase of a bifurcated case, then the burden of proof shifts on-
to the employer to prove, in the second phase of the case, that any
particular employment action it took against any individual mem-
ber of that group was not the result of unlawful discrimination.
Since Teamsters, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and private plaintiffs have pursued the systemic disparate
treatment theory-sometimes called the pattern or practice theory
antidiscrimination law ever since. See generally Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a
Mistake, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 702-03 (2006).
5. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). See also Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 635, 644-45 (9th Cir. 2010) (IkutaJ., dissenting) cert. granted in
part, 131 S. Ct. 795, 178 L. Ed. 2d 530 (U.S. 2010) and rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (high-
lighting the difficulty in applying the systemic disparate treatment proof framework,
including bifurcated trial procedures, to the largest class action ever certified). Although the
issues presented to the Supreme Court in Dukes center on procedural issues involving class
certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, substantive questions
about the proper scope and application of the systemic disparate treatment theory lurk
beneath the surface and were raised at the oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 46-47, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, No. 10-277, 2010 WIL 3358931 (2010). Recognizing the poten-
tial of the Dukes case to act as a catalyst for change in substantive disparate treatment theory,
legal scholars have only recently begun to turn their attention to systemic disparate treat-
ment law. See Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that systemic disparate treatment liability has
been under-theorized due to a misguided focus on individual-level wrongdoing, rather than
organization-level wrongdoing); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32
BERKELEY J. Emu. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2011).
6. 431 U.S. at 360-62; see also Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Dis-
crimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 353, 357, n.19
(2008) (calling Teamsters the Court's "foundational systemic disparate treatment case");
Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1243,
1268 (2008) (referring to Teamsters as the "seminal systemic disparate treatment case").
7. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360-61.
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or the pattern or practice method of proof6-in a variety of em-
ployment discrimination cases.9
Today, systemic disparate treatment doctrine is in disarray. Ques-
tions abound regarding what types of discrimination claims,
brought under which statutes, are subject to the Teamsters two-part
burden-shifting analysis because of the unique characteristics of
certain types of discrimination claims and slight variances among
the relevant antidiscrimination statutes. For example, it is not clear
whether the Teamsters method of proof should be available to age
discrimination plaintiffs under the ADEA, disability discrimination
plaintiffs under the ADA, or hostile work environment plaintiffs
under any of the antidiscrimination statutes. It is also uncertain
whether the Teamsters method of proof should be available to indi-
vidual private plaintiffs, or if it is only available to private plaintiffs,
where a class has been certified under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Although some commentators have addressed isolated issues in
systemic disparate treatment law, there has not yet been an effort
in the literature to formulate a consistent theoretical approach that
can help resolve these doctrinal issues and guide the future devel-
opment of systemic disparate treatment law."o Principled
approaches to systemic disparate treatment cases and clearer think-
ing on the Teamsters burden-shifting doctrine are becoming
increasingly important. One reason is the EEOC's renewed empha-
sis on enforcing systemic discrimination cases. In 2006, the
Commission announced a "Systemic Initiative" as part of its en-
forcement strategy. Tackling, in part, systemic disparate treatment,
the implementation of the Systemic Initiative is a top priority for
the EEOC." According to the EEOC, the launch of the Systemic
8. See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 Fed. App'x 707, 715 (10th Cir. 2008) (re-
ferring to "the pattern-or-practice method of proof"); Bacon v. Honda of America Mfg., 370
F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (same).
9. Cf Timothy G. Healy, Comment, Sexual Pattern: Why a Pattern or Practice Theory of
Liability is not an Appropriate Framework for Claims of Sexual Harassment, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 537, 541 (2005) ("The pattern or practice theory of liability has been an essential
tool in combating widespread, institutional discrimination.").
10. Examples of attempts to address individual pattern or practice doctrinal problems
include:Jason R. Bent, Systemic Harassment, 77 TENN. L. REV. 151 (2009); Healy, supra note 9;
and David J. Bross, Note, The Use of Pattern-And-Practice 0 Individuals in Non-Class Claims, 28
NOVA L. REV. 795 (2004).
11. See EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 9
(2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2008/
par2008.pdf; EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS AND AccoM-
PLISHMENTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL § II.A. (2007), available at
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/reports/07annrpt/index.html ("To accomplish the goals
of the systemic initiative, the Office of General Counsel anticipates a shift in the composi-
800 [VOL. 44:4
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Initiative has been successful and is reflected in recent litigation
statistics. As long as the EEOC continues to prioritize systemic
discrimination cases, difficult questions about the contours of the
systemic disparate treatment theory will continue to surface in the
courts.
This Article develops the missing theoretical foundation for sys-
temic disparate treatment law and provides a roadmap for
resolving questions about the proper application of Teamsters. It
begins by examining the historical roots of the systemic disparate
treatment theory. It demonstrates that, at its core, the Teamsters
doctrine-like much of employment discrimination doctrine-is
simply an evidentiary device for allocating and shifting burdens of
proof among the parties. More specifically, it is a device for deter-
mining how the burdens of production and persuasion on the
element of discriminatory intent should be allocated at an identifi-
able point during the course of a systemic discrimination case.
Having established the operational nature of the systemic disparate
treatment theory, the Article turns to the policy considerations that
inform burden allocation and shifting in general civil litigation. It
examines the considerations offered in traditional evidence litera-
ture as well as those suggested more recently in the law and eco-
economics scholarship. By examining these policy considerations,
this Article develops the proper foundation for analyzing, develop-
tion of its litigation docket over time. We expect fewer small, individual cases and more
cases on behalf of larger groups of individuals.").
12. Statistics offered at a Commission meeting held on June 18, 2008 reflect the
EEOC's new emphasis on systemic cases:
I want to start with my conclusion which is that the EEOC has made substantial pro-
gress towards a revitalized and dynamic Systemic program following the Systemic
Initiative adopted by the Commission in April 2006. The results support this conclu-
sion. There is a striking increase in the number of Commissioner charges. As of May
31, 2008, 45 Commissioner charges were under investigation. Only 15 Commissioner
charges were in investigation as of March 31, 2006. In fiscal year 2007, 24 Commis-
sioner charges were developed and approved. Only 11 were signed in fiscal year 2006.
In the first half of fiscal year 2008, 12 new Commissioner charges had been signed.
The number of Systemic charges has also increased dramatically. From just over 200
Systemic cases in investigation prior to March 31, 2006 to over 1,000 as of May 31,
2008. Over 550 Systemic charges have been resolved since the adoption of the Sys-
temic Initiative. Approximately 400 merit closures in which nearly $10,000,000 in
monetary benefits has been obtained and approximately 1,200 persons were benefit-
ed through the administrative process.
Transcript of EEOC Commission Meeting of June 18, 2008 on Strategic Plan, Systemic Pro-
gram and State and Local Program (Jun. 18, 2008) [hereinafter EEOC Transcript]
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ing, and applying the systemic disparate treatment theory in em-
ployment discrimination law.
The conclusion drawn here is that the proper application of the
systemic disparate treatment theory depends on three critical fac-
tors:
(1) Prior Probability (or Estimated Prevalence of the Discrimi-
nation Type): The estimated prior likelihood that the
alleged unlawful discrimination actually occurred,
before considering any evidence offered in the pre-
sent case. This factor might also be thought of as
the background prevalence of the particular type of
discrimination alleged.
(2) Evidentiary Signak The estimated probability that
one would observe a particular evidentiary "signal"
in Phase I of a bifurcated systemic disparate treat-
ment case, assuming that the alleged discrimination
did occur-and conversely, the estimated probabil-
ity that one would observe that same evidentiary
"signal" assuming that the alleged discrimination
did not occur. In systemic disparate treatment cases,
the evidentiary signal at issue will generally be statis-
tical evidence proffered by the parties in Phase I.
(3) Information Costs- The estimated relative costs facing
each party in searching for, finding, and presenting
evidence establishing (or refuting) the alleged dis-
criminatory intent.
The careful examination of these three factors will help deci-
sion-makers determine when and under what circumstances a
systemic disparate treatment burden-shifting scheme is appropri-
ate. Examination of these factors will allow a court to decide, in any
particular systemic disparate treatment discrimination case, wheth-
er burden-shifting is justified after considering and weighing the
proffered Phase I evidence.
The usefulness of this theoretical foundation extends beyond
just informing courts' decisions in individual systemic discrimina-
tion cases. Generalizations might be made about types of
employment discrimination cases based on-what can be observed
about those categories of cases. These generalizations can assist in
determining the proper doctrinal extent of the systemic disparate
treatment method of proof. Legislators and appellate courts can
use an analysis of the three key factors identified herein to make
principled decisions about what types of cases are appropriate for
802 [VOL. 44:4
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systemic disparate treatment burden-shifting, and amend the anti-
discrimination statutes and/or develop the Teamsters judicial
doctrine accordingly. Thus, the theoretical foundation described
above can assist in resolving the uncertainties in systemic disparate
treatment theory.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores Teamsters and
the origins of the systemic disparate treatment theory. The Part
discusses systemic disparate treatment theory as a tool for allocat-
ing and shifting the burdens of production and persuasion with
respect to the element of discriminatory intent. Part I also briefly
considers some of the significant uncertainties that have recently
developed in systemic disparate treatment law.
Part II begins the process of developing the proper foundation
for application of the systemic disparate treatment theory and ex-
plores the policy roots of the systemic disparate treatment theory
under both traditional and economic justifications for burden al-
location and shifting in civil litigation. Such justifications suggest
the factors of prior probability, evidentiary signal, and information
cost should be determinative in the proper application of the sys-
temic disparate treatment theory.
Part III applies the principles developed in Parts I and II to the
specific context of systemic disparate treatment employment dis-
crimination. Further, the Part explores how courts have
misconstrued the evidentiary signal provided by statistical evi-
dence, and overlooked the importance of prior probabilities and
asymmetrical access to evidence in employment discrimination
cases.
Finally, Part IV demonstrates how policymakers and appellate
courts can use the principles this Article develops to make general-
izations about categories of employment discrimination cases for
which systemic disparate treatment burden-shifting might be ap-
propriate.
I. ORIGINS OF THE SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT THEORY
A. Title VII and Teamsters: Drawing Inferences of Discriminatory
Intent in Systemic Disparate Treatment Cases
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
in the terms or conditions of employment "because of . . . race,
SUMMER 2011 ] 803
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color, religion, sex, or national origin." 3 Disparate treatment dis-
crimination is often described as "the most easily understood type
of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less fa-
vorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."4 Discriminatory intent or motive is the key to a
disparate treatment case, "although it can ... be inferred from
the mere fact of differences in treatment."5
The systemic disparate treatment theory describes one method of
creating an inference of the required discriminatory intent." Sys-
temic disparate treatment theory has been defined by some as
encompassing two different types of cases: (1) cases in which an
employer explicitly announces or admits a formal or express policy
treating employees differently on the basis of a protected charac-
teristic, and (2) cases in which no express or announced policy
exists, but there is evidence that the employer consistently treats
employees differently on the basis of such protected characteris-
tics." Others define systemic disparate treatment cases as only
those falling into the second category and involving the use of sta-
tistical evidence to create an inference of discriminatory intent.
There is no need to use an inference to establish discriminatory
intent in cases falling within the first category."
Decided in 1977, Teamsters is an example of the second category
and is the cornerstone of the systemic disparate treatment theory.o
13. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2006)).
14. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
15. Id.; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.01, at 146-47. This is to be contrasted
with disparate impact cases, where "liability does not depend upon a finding of intent to
discriminate." Id. at § 4.01; see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (similar).
16. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.03[C].
17. See, e.g, id. § 3.01. Cases involving the explicit use of protected characteristics in
announced policies have become increasingly rare. See id.
18. RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINA-
TION: USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES § 1:8, at 1-26 (Thompson
West 2006); see alsoSULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.01, at 146 n.4. Cases falling within the
second category are sometimes referred to in the case law and scholarship as "pattern or
practice" cases, and I will accordingly use that terminology at times in this Article. Although
I am primarily concerned with the second category of cases, the principles that I develop
herein might also be used to analyze cases from the first category. See infta note 168.
19. See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (the Team-
sters burden-shifting framework is unnecessary where the case involves an employer's facially
discriminatory policy, because the fact to be uncovered by the burden-shifting scheme has
already been admitted). Where an employer maintains a formal policy that treats employees
differently based on race or sex the discriminatory intent is established without the aid of an
inference, and the defendant must then resort to defending its policy as a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification. See SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 1 § 3.02[B], at pp. 167-170.
20. See SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.01. Earlier cases established the concept of
shifting burdens based on inferences of discrimination in the employment discrimination
context. See, e.g. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (setting out
804 [VOL. 44:4
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In Teamsters, the United States government, as plaintiff, alleged that
the defendant employer engaged in a "pattern or practice" of dis-
criminating against minorities in hiring for certain positions and in
the pay, assignments, and promotions of those minorities that were
hired.' The Teamsters Court held that statistical evidence of a
longstanding and gross disparity between the composition of the
defendant's workforce and the general population could serve as a
"telltale sign" of discrimination and support an inference of dis-
criminatory intent.
The Teamsters Court drew upon language in Title VII that ex-
pressly authorizes the government to pursue "pattern or practice"
enforcement actions. The relevant text provides that whenever
the government has cause to believe that a defendant "is engaged
in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment" of the
rights secured by Title VII, and "that the pattern or practice is of
such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise" of those
rights, the government may bring a civil action in federal district
court.24 Title VII was later amended to expressly permit private in-
dividuals to file charges alleging a pattern or practice of
discrimination and the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII as
allowing private pattern or practice actions.
the basic prima facie case for individual claims of discrimination). Burden-shifting under
the heading "pattern or practice" had been recognized in Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747
(1976), involving a private class action. However, Teamsters is generally considered the semi-
nal case for the modern systemic disparate treatment doctrine because of its approval of the
use of statistical evidence in Phase I to establish the pattern or practice and to justify shifting
the burden of proof onto the defendant. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; see also
Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 Fed. App'x 707, 715 (10th Cir. 2008) (referring to Teamsters
as "the seminal case on the pattern-or-practice method of proof."); David G. Karro, Common
Sense About Common Claims, 25 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 33, 45 (2007) (referring to Teamsters
as "the seminal pattern-or-practice case"); Healy, supra note 9, at 541 (similar).
21. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1977). The govern-
ment alleged that defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against
minorities in hiring line drivers. Those minorities that were hired were allegedly given less
desirable assignments and less pay, and were discriminated against in promotion decisions.
Id. at 329, 335.
22. 431 U.S. at 339 n.20.
23. See 431 U.S. at 329-30 n.1 (quoting the "pattern or practice" language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-6(a) (1970) (amended 1972)).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2006). The power to bring pattern or practice suits under
Section 707 was originally vested in the Attorney General. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 241, 261-62 (1964). In 1972, Congress amended
Section 707 to transfer this authority to the EEOC. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-6(c)-(e)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e). See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 5 (au-
thorizing the EEOC to investigate and act on pattern or practice charges filed by
individuals); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 n.9 (1984) ("Alt-
hough Teamsters involved an action litigated on the merits by the Government as plaintiff
805
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In Teamsters, the Court set out the two-phase litigation frame-
work used in modern systemic disparate treatment cases. The
plaintiffs burden, in Phase I, is to prove the existence of a pattern
or practice of discrimination by the employer.16 If the plaintiff suc-
cessfully meets this burden, it creates a rebuttable presumption
that all individual employment decisions made during the period
of the pattern or practice were discriminatory. The employer then
bears the burden, in Phase II, of rebutting this presumption by
proving that any individual employment decisions were not the
product of discrimination.
In setting out this pattern or practice framework, the Teamsters
Court approved the use of statistical evidence in Phase I to demon-
strate the existence of the employer's pattern or practice of
discrimination.2 The Court noted that statistical analyses "serve an
important role" in cases where there is a dispute about the exist-
ence of discrimination. In footnote 20, the Court famously
explained that: "[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be ex-
pected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in
a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which em-
ployees are hired.""o
The Court explained that statistical evidence of an imbalance "is
often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination."0' The rationale
under § 707(a) of the Act, it is plain that the elements of a prima facie pattern-or-practice
case are the same in a private class action.") (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358-60).
26. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360 ("[The government's] initial burden is to demonstrate
that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employ-
er or group of employers.").
27. Id. at 362.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 340 n.20.
30. Id. The Court's reasoning in footnote 20 is largely responsible for the proliferation
of statistical evidence in employment discrimination cases. However, some commentators
have criticized the Court for overlooking factors other than discrimination-such as appli-
cant self-selection-that would systematically prevent an observed work force from
resembling the work force that would be expected if hiring decisions were made randomly.
See Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and
the 80% Rule, 9 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 139 (1984). Meier contends that the quoted text from
footnote 20 is "untenable, and it can only be given a reasonable interpretation as a state-
ment of the impartiality with which the Court must approach a case of this kind." Id. at 158.
But see Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assump-
tion, 26 CONN. L. REv. 997, 997 n.2, 1025-36 (1994) (defending the Court's reasoning in
footnote 20 as the "basic assumption," and contending that the assumption remains justi-
fied).
31. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20. The Court was careful to distinguish this role of sta-
tistics as a "telltale sign of purposeful discrimination" from the imposition of a quota or
similar requirement that the workforce resemble the general population. Id. The Court
stated: "Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force
The Telltale Sign ofDiscrimination
for Teamsters is therefore an evidentiary one. Discriminatory intent
remains a key element of any disparate treatment claim, but in
systemic disparate treatment cases like Teamsters statistical evidence
can, where appropriate, support an inference of that discriminato-
ry intent and justify shifting the burden of proof onto the defend-
defendant for that element.
The Court recognized that the burden-shifting framework it
described was in accordance with general burden-shifting princi-
ples:
The holding in Franks that proof of a discriminatory pattern
and practice creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of in-
dividual relief is consistent with the manner in which
presumptions are created generally. Presumptions shifting the
burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of
probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to the
proof
32
In this passage, the Teamsters Court identified two key features of
systemic disparate treatment cases that justify shifting the burden
of proof on the element of discriminatory intent: (1) probability
assessments and (2) relative access to proof.
B. Teamsters Applied to Systemic Disparate Treatment Law
Since Teamsters, the Supreme Court has rarely addressed systemic
disparate treatment discrimination cases. The drought of Su-
preme Court decisions has been especially noticeable in recent
and that of the general population thus may be significant even though § 703(j) makes clear
that Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population." Id.
32. Id. at 359 n.45 (emphasis added) (citing C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 337,
343 (2d ed. 1972)); FlemingJames,Jr., Burdens of Proof 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 61 (1961); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973)). The Teamsters Court appears to have envi-
sioned a shift in both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion, although it
did not use those terms. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. If plaintiff meets its bur-
den in Phase I, then the defendant must "demonstrate that the individual applicant was
denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362. The dis-
tinctions between the burdens of persuasion and production are further discussed below. See
infra Part L.C.
33. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318 (1980); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). The Court has also
recently acknowledged and reserved ruling on some difficult questions arising in the system-
ic disparate treatment context, including how the timely-filed charge requirement should be
applied in pattern or practice cases. See, e.g., Nat'1 Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 115 n.9 (2002).
SUMMER 2011 ] 807
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
years. In the interim, a number of fundamental uncertainties about
the application of the doctrine have emerged.
1. Age Discrimination
Can the Teamsters doctrine be utilized in age discrimination cases
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 34 ?
This question stems from differences between the statutory text of
the ADEA and Title VII. Title VII, which addresses discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, contains
the language in Section 2000e-6(a), quoted above, that includes
express references to the term "pattern or practice."3 5 The ADEA
contains no similar language and has no reference to "pattern or
practice.""
Employers have argued that this textual difference is significant,
but lower courts have not found it problematic. Several circuit
courts have allowed ADEA plaintiffs to use the Teamsters framework."
Their common reason is that the pattern or practice framework was
developed by courts to assist in their decision-making and that de-
spite the absence of an express statutory reference to "pattern or
practice" in the ADEA, it is nonetheless appropriate to borrow the
framework from Title VII cases and apply it in ADEA cases.
Given the recent resurgent emphasis on rigid textualism, there
is reason to question whether the current Supreme Court would
allow the Teamsters framework developed in the Title VII context to
be used in ADEA claims because the ADEA lacks any reference to
"pattern or practice" liability. This possibility is illustrated by the
Court's 2009 decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.0 There,
the Supreme Court-on its own initiative and before reaching the
question certified by the parties-considered "whether the burden
of persuasion ever shifts to the party defending an alleged mixed-
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
35. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; see also Thompson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 582 F.3d 1125, 1127
(10th Cir. 2009) ("Unlike Title VII, the ADEA contains no express reference to pattern-or-
practice claims."); King v. Gen. Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, _624 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting the
ADEA "has no parallel provision" to Title ViI's pattern or practice language).
37. See, e.g., Thompson, 582 F.3d at 1129; King, 960 F.2d at 624.
38. See Thompson, 582 F.3d at 1129; Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208,
1227 (11th Cir. 2001); King, 960 F.2d at 624; Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d
Cir. 1984); EEOC v. W. Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1016 (4th Cir. 1983); Marshall v. Sun Oil
Co., 605 F.2d 1331, 1336 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1979).
39. See, e.g., Thompson, 582 F.3d at 1129; King, 960 F.2d at 624.
40. 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350-52 (2009).
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motives discrimination claim brought under the ADEA."4  The
Court held that it did not, focusing on textual differences between
Title VII-specifically, the 1991 Amendments to Title VII-and the
ADEA. 42 The Court emphasized that, "[w] hen conducting statutory
interpretation, we 'must be careful not to apply rules applicable
under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical
examination.' 4 3
Because Title VII contains an express reference to "pattern or
practice," (a textual reference relied upon by the Teamsters Court44)
and the ADEA does not, textualist reasoning like that employed in
the Gross opinion could lead the Court to preclude application of
the Teamsters doctrine in ADEA cases. The Supreme Court has
never addressed the question, and the Gross opinion may have cre-
ated uncertainty in this area. 6 Indeed, employers are already
raising precisely this argument in the wake of Gross.
This is typical of other areas in systemic disparate treatment law
that are unsettled. This dispute highlights the need to develop a
foundation, based upon sound policy considerations, for determin-
ing when and how the systemic disparate treatment theory should
be applied.
41. Id. at 2348.
42. Id. at 2348-49 (noting that Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally when
it amended Title VII without simultaneously amending the ADEA).
43. Id. at 2349 (quoting Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393
(2008)).
44. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329 n.1 (1977).
45. The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Thompson, decided after Gross, rejected this line of
argument advanced by the defendant. Thompson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 582 F.3d 1125, 1131
(10th Cir. 2009). The Thompson court reasoned that the mixed-motive burden-shifting
framework at issue in Gross was of a different kind and was founded on the text of the 1991
statutory amendments, while the pattern or practice burden-shifting doctrine is "mentioned
in neither statute" and "has been established by the courts." Id. It remains to be seen wheth-
er other courts will agree with this distinction. In particular, it should be noted that the
mixed-motive burden-shifting doctrine was originally a judicially created doctrine, and that
Congress amended Title VII (but not the ADEA) in 1991 to override the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the mixed-motive burden-shifting standards in the fractured opinion in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
94-95 (2003). See generally Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse
is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1909-14 (2004). Prior to the Gross
decision, lower courts frequently applied the same mixed-motive burden-shifting analysis to
ADEA and Title VII cases. See Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 186 (3rd Cir. 2009) (or-
dan, J., concurring) (collecting cases); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
857, 868-69 (2010).
46. Brown, 581 F.3d at 186 (Jordan, J., concurring) (noting that the Court's "funda-
mental instruction in Gross [was] that analytical constructs are not to be simply transposed
from one statute to another without a thorough and thoughtful analysis").
47. See Thompson, 582 F.3d 1125, 1131.
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2. Disability Discrimination
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")48 presents a differ-
ent type of problem than the one presented by the ADEA.
Although the ADA's statutory text does not include the "pattern or
practice" language found in Title VII, it does (unlike the ADEA)
expressly incorporate the remedies and procedures set forth in Ti-
tle VII, including 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (Section 707 of Title VII),
which contains the reference to "pattern or practice" liability.
Thus, the text at least facially supports application of Teamsters in
ADA cases.50 Still, there remains doubt. Although some courts of
appeals have suggested that application of the Teamsters framework
is appropriate in ADA cases, none have "addressed directly if and
how this framework might apply to a private-plaintiff pattern-or-
practice class action under the ADA."5 1
The primary argument against the application of the systemic
disparate treatment theory in ADA cases is the uniquely individual-
ized inquiry needed to determine whether a plaintiff is a "qualified
individual with a disability" under the statute. The ADA prohibits
covered employers from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability."52 A "qualified individual with a disability," is
defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds or desires."
The definition requires courts to make an individualized inquiry.
Although categorizations of race, sex, national origin, and religion
can sometimes be imprecise, they do not require the same type of
highly individualized inquiry that the ADA demands.
48. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended primarily in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12231 (2006)).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006) ("The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in
sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers,
remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney
General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any
provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, con-
cerning employment.").
50. See Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., 574 F.3d 169, 180, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2009) (as-
suming, without deciding, that 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) and Title VII jurisprudence combine to
make application of the Teamsters pattern or practice framework in ADA cases appropriate);
Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 1999). Notably, the three judge appellate
panel in Hohider included retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sitting by designation.
51. Hohider, 574 F.3d at 179 n.11; see also EEOC v. Murray, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1060 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (noting shortage of circuit court authorities). In Hohider, the Third
Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the Teamsters framework could be applied to ADA
cases. 574 F.3d at 182-83.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
53. Id. § 12111(8).
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As the court in Hohider explained, " [t] he ADA does not define
the scope of its protections and prohibitions as broadly as Title VII
... [I]t does not prohibit discrimination against any individual
based on disability .... Rather, it prohibits discrimination only
against "qualified individuals."" Therefore, the question of wheth-
er a defendant unlawfully discriminated against, or failed to
provide reasonable accommodations to, any group of disabled per-
sons in violation of the ADA will require an initial inquiry into
whether any or all of the individuals were "qualified individual [s]
with a disability."06 Courts have split on whether this inquiry would
need to be performed at Phase I of a Teamsters systemic disparate
treatment case, or whether it could await individual liability deter-
minations in Phase II.5 Whether and how to apply the Teamsters
systemic disparate treatment theory in ADA cases remains a diffi-
cult question for the courts.
3. Hostile Work Environment
No area of systemic disparate treatment law is more unsettled
and contentious than its potential application to hostile work envi-
ronment harassment claims. One district court recently referred to
pattern or practice of harassment claims as a "still uncertain theory
of liability."" The array of problems with applying Teamsters to hos-
tile work environment cases include: the lack of statistical evidence
in harassment cases, determining how to incorporate the subjective
element of a harassment claim into the two phase framework of
Teamsters, resolving questions about which individuals may properly
be included in the class seeking relief, determining how many
claimants is sufficient to constitute a "pattern or practice" justifying
54. Hohider, 574 F.3d at 191.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
56. Id.; Hohider, 574 F.3d at 192; see also EEOC v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 128 F. Supp.
2d 117, 124 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
57. Compare Hohider, 574 F.3d at 192 (must be determined in Phase I), andJB. Hunt,
128 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (same), with Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 1999)
(affirming the district court's application of Teamsters such that the government would not
need to prove the "qualified individuals" requirement until Phase II), and EEOC v. Murray,
Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1060 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (can be determined in Phase II). See also
Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REv. 434, 464 (2007)
("The same is true under the ADA, which has allowed the EEOC, in the few class-type cases
it has brought, to escape thorny class issues of individualized inquiries that courts usually
view as necessary to determine disability.").
58. EEOC v. Carrols Corp., No. 5:98 CV 1772, 2005 WL 928634, at *2 n.4 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 20, 2005); see also Healy, supra note 9, at 579 (arguing that the pattern or practice bur-
den-shifting doctrine should never apply in harassment cases).
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application of the Teamsters doctrine, and answering questions
about how the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to a harassment
claim properly can be applied in the context of a systemic case.59
Even where the application of Teamsters to systemic harassment
cases has been allowed, courts and scholars have questioned
whether a successful showing that the employer engaged in a pat-
tern or practice of tolerating harassment in Phase I (however that
might be accomplished without statistics) should be sufficient to
shift the burden of proof onto the defendant (or create an infer-
ence of unlawful harassment in favor of the claimants) in Phase
II.6 Whether Teamsters burden-shifting should be permitted in hos-
61tile work environment cases remains an open question.
4. Individual (Non-Class Action) Private Plaintiffs
Can individual private plaintiffs utilize the systemic disparate
treatment theory to prove discrimination? Many individual dis-
crimination plaintiffs have attempted to invoke the Teamsters
burden-shifting mechanism. Defendants contend that pattern or
practice claims necessarily involve the existence of a group of vic-
tims, and therefore, the Teamsters burden-shifting framework
should be available to private plaintiffs only where a class action is
certified under Federal Rule 23.
This question has reached the appellate level in a number of
circuits, and the overwhelming majority of the circuits have been
persuaded by defendants' arguments. The rule in at least seven
circuits is that a private individual plaintiff cannot pursue a Team-
59. See Bent, supra note 10.
60. See EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., Inc., No. 01 C 4427, 2007 WL 3120069, at *14
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2007) (arguing that the burden of proof should not shift to defendant,
even after a finding of liability in Phase I of a pattern or practice of harassment case); see also
Bent, supra note 10, at 188-89; Healy, supra note 9, at 576-78. But see EEOC v. CRST Van
Expedited, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 918, 936-37 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (determining that a modified
burden-shifting approach is the law of the Eighth Circuit); EEOC v. Dial, 156 F. Supp. 2d
926, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (burden-shifting appropriate after a finding of pattern or practice
liability in Phase I); EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1077
(C.D. Il1. 1998) (same). The question of whether the burden of proof should shift in a pat-
tern or practice of harassment case is complicated by the types of statistics available in
harassment cases-usually, only the frequency and distribution of harassment complaints
compared to the number and distribution of women in the workforce. See Bent, supra note
10, at 170. Additional complications are introduced by the subjective element required for a
claim of hostile work environment and by the availability of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense for employers. See id. at 168-69.
61. See Bent, supra note 10, at 157.
62. See cases cited infra note 63; Bross, supra note 10, at 804-05.
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sters framework claim." Only the D.C. circuit has even arguably in-
dicated a willingness to apply Teamsters burden-shifting in favor of
individual private plaintiffs. Several of the courts prohibiting bur-
den-shifting for individuals have nonetheless allowed the
individual plaintiff to use available evidence of a pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination (such as statistical evidence of disparities) to
help prove the pretext portion of an individual claim within the
65
individual disparate treatment framework of McDonnell Douglas.
Again, the Supreme Court has not considered the issue.
5. Potential for Additional Confusion in Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law
The foregoing uncertainties are not minor ones. They represent
fundamental questions about the extent and application of the sys-
temic disparate treatment theory. The issues come up repeatedly,
as demonstrated by the number of federal district court and appel-
late court opinions addressing or referencing the topics. Further,
any amendments to existing antidiscrimination statutes have the
potential to add to this confusion.6 6 The enactment of new antidis-
crimination laws that fail to explicitly address the systemic dispar-
67
disparate treatment theory may also create new doctrinal issues.
63. See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 Fed. App'x 707, 716-17 (10th Cir. 2008); Davis
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 967 n.24, 969 n.30 (11th Cir. 2008) (disapproving of
an argument that prior Eleventh Circuit authority permitted individuals to pursue pattern
or practice burden-shifting); Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 429-30 (4th Cir.
2004); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); Celestine v. Petroleos
de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2001); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742,
761 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Gilty v. Village of Oak
Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990); Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469-
70 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Bross, supra note 10, at 796-97.
64. See Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Bross, supra
note 10, at 807-08.
65. See, e.g., Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1227 n.2 (10th
Cir. 2006); Lowery, 158 F.3d at 761. This approach would allow the individual plaintiff to use
statistical evidence of systemic discrimination in order to bolster a claim of pretext under
the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, for which the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof. See Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 2000) (in non-systemic cases, statistical
evidence can be relevant and probative on the issue of pretext); see also SULLIVAN ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 5.04[B].
66. For example, in the ADFA context the law appeared to be relatively settled that the
pattern or practice theory was available to plaintiffs until the 1991 Amendments and the
Supreme Court's decision in Gross opened the door for the textualist argument advanced by
the defendants in Thompson v. Weyerhaeuser Co. 582 F.3d 1125, 1131 (10th Cir. 2009); see also
Katz, supra note 45, at 867-71.
67. For example, the newest federal antidiscrimination law, the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), became effective on November 21, 2009. See Pub. L.
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The uncertainty will continue to grow unless it is met directly-
either by the legislature addressing the systemic disparate treat-
ment theory explicitly in statutory text, or by courts adopting a
coherent and principled approach to the application of Teamsters
under the various antidiscrimination statutes.
C. A Note About Burdens of Production and Persuasion
The Teamsters Court refers to the "burden of proof' in setting
out the systemic disparate treatment theory,6 but that term glosses
over an important complexity. The burden of proof can be divided
into two separate components: the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion. Although this distinction can be a slippery
one, it nonetheless plays an important role in systemic disparate
treatment theory.
Evidence and procedure scholars have long recognized a con-
ceptual distinction between the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion." The burden of production (sometimes
No. 110-233, Title II, 122 Stat. 905 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (Supp. II
2007-2009)). GINA generally incorporates the enforcement provisions of Title VII, includ-
ing Section 707 of Title VII, which contains the operative phrase "pattern or practice." See 42
U.S.C. § 2000ff-6(a)(1). GINA may add a new wrinkle to the analysis, however, because it
provides that disparate impact is not a viable theory under GINA-at least not yet. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000ff-7(a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 'disparate impact', as
that term is used in section 2000e-2(k) of this title, on the basis of genetic information does
not establish a cause of action under this Act."). GINA creates a commission to review the
development of genetic sciences and to make recommendations regarding whether the
disparate impact theory should be made available to plaintiffs under GINA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ff-7(b). GINA contains no similar language expressly precluding a systemic disparate
treatment theory. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-1l. However, the express disapproval of the
disparate impact theory suggests that the legislature may not have intended for GINA to
provide systemic disparate treatment claims based upon statistical evidence.
68. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
69. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 761, 763-66 (3d ed. 1996). ("[T]he subject of burdens
is among the most slippery in the larger areas of procedure and evidence, and attempts to
refine what we know lead quickly to difficulty."); John T. McNaughton, Burden of Production
of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1382 (1955) (observ-
ing that the two burdens are related); Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof Uncertainty, and
Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 627, 634 (1994).
- 70. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.12, at 414 (5th ed. 2001)
("The term 'burden of proof is used to refer to two different concepts. Until the distinction
was defined by James Bradley Thayer in 1898, the reasoning of the decisions on this point
was hopelessly confused. The two distinct concepts may be referred to as (1) the risk of
nonpersuasion, sometimes called the 'burden of persuasion,' and (2) the duty of producing
evidence (or burden of production), sometimes called the 'burden of going forward with
the evidence.'") (footnotes omitted); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 69, at 763-66;
Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 273,
274 n.1 (2008).
The Telltale Sign ofDiscrimination
called the "risk of non-production" or the "burden of going for-
ward with evidence") refers to the burden of coming forward with
evidence on the point at issue.7 ' There is not only a directional
component to the burden of production, but also a sufficiency
component. The party bearing the burden of production must
come forward with something more than just a scintilla of evi-
dence; it must come forward with evidence sufficient to justify a
reasonable jury finding in its favor on the point.7 2
The burden of persuasion, in contrast, becomes relevant once
all of the evidence has been submitted and considered by the trier
of fact. The party bearing the burden of persuasion must affirma-
tively convince the trier of fact that it has proven, to the required
level or standard of proof, the material facts necessary to prevail."
In most civil cases, the applicable standard is proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The party bearing the burden of
persuasion in a civil case will lose if, after considering all of the
submitted evidence, the trier of fact's "mind is in equipoise."1
However, these two components of the "burden of proof' are
not completely independent. Mueller and Kirkpatrick described
their relationship as follows:
The burdens of production and persuasion are related: The
first requires a party to produce sufficient evidence to permit
reasonable persons on the jury to find the point with the req-
uisite measure of certainty, as defined by the burden of
persuasion. The second means, in most civil actions, proof by
a preponderance-that is, evidence which persuades the jury
(acting as reasonable persons) that the points to be proved
are more likely so than not.
71. SeeJAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.15, at 417 ("The second meaning that is com-
monly given to the term 'burden of proof refers to the burden of coming forward with
evidence. This is sometimes called 'the burden of production.' (A more accurate term might
be 'the risk of nonproduction,' but this expression is not in general use.)").
72. See 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 3:4, at 434 (3d ed. 2007) ("A party carries the burden of production by introducing evi-
dence sufficient to support the findings of fact that are necessary if she is to prevail.").
73. SeeJAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.13.
74. See id. § 7.14.
75. Id. § 7.13. Professor Chris Sanchirico has argued that the term "equipoise" is not
defined with sufficient precision. See Chris William Sanchirico, The Burden of Proof in Civil
Litigation: A Simple Model of Mechanism Design, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 431 (1997).
76. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 69, at 766 (footnote omitted); see also Ronald
J. Allen, Burdens of Proof Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL. 627, 634 (1994) ("Immediately, then, it becomes apparent that there are not two
analytically distinct components to burdens of proof; as Professor McNaughton saw many
decades ago, burdens of production are a function of burdens of persuasion. A burden of
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Ordinarily, both the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion are initially assigned to the plaintiff in civil cases." In
many areas of law, and particularly in employment discrimination
law, courts use various presumptions to shift the burden of produc-
tion back and forth. In the case that has largely defined individual
disparate treatment law, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Su-
preme Court set out a framework for shifting the burden of
production. 8 If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, then the burden of production shifts to the defendant
to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse em-
ployment action. If the defendant does so, then the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's proffered reason was pretextual.7 9 The
McDonnell Douglas scheme shifts onto defendant the burden of
production;"0 however, the burden of persuasion never shifts.'
It is not as obvious which burden is supposed to be shifting in a
Teamsters systemic disparate treatment case. The terms "burden of
persuasion" and "burden of production" are notably absent from
the Teamsters opinion."' Courts and commentators have generally
agreed, however, that the rebuttable presumption (or inference) of
the required discriminatory intent prescribed by Teamsters amounts
production is satisfied when a reasonable person applying the relevant burden of persuasion
could find in favor of the person bearing the burden of persuasion. Together, they operate
to bring order to the evidentiary process at trial.") (footnote omitted); McNaughton, supra
note 69.
77. See infra Part II.A.
78. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
79. See id. at 804; see also Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 109, 117 (2007); Zimmer, supra note 45, at 1894-95.
80. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) ("Although in-
termediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, '[t]he ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'") (quoting Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)); Id. at 142 ("This burden is one of production, not per-
suasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'") (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)); see also Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive
and Well, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 383, 398 n.102 (2004).
81. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143. That the burden of persuasion never shifts is due to the rel-
atively weak showing required of a plaintiff in order to make out a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas. See Price Waterhouse v._Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 267, 270-71 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Essentially, a prima facie case under the traditional McDonnell
Douglas framework merely rules out the "two most common" and easily identified legitimate
reasons for an adverse employment action: that the plaintiff was not qualified (or less quali-
fied) for the position and that the position sought was not vacant. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). Where a higher initial showing is made by
the plaintiff, the "strong medicine" of a shift in the burden of persuasion can be justified. See
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
82. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324.
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to a shift in the burden of persuasion, not just the burden of pro-
duction.
In her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor
pointed to Teamsters as an example of when the law permits a shift
of the burden of persuasion, rather than just a shift in the burden
of production." In explaining that a shift in the burden of persua-
sion can be justified in appropriate cases, Justice O'Connor
stressed the importance of judicial estimates of probabilities and
the parties' relative access to proof.' When a plaintiffs initial show-
ing has only a weak effect on the court's estimate of the probability
of unlawful discriminatory intent (as in the plaintiffs showing in a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case) , a shift in only the burden of
production will be appropriate. However, where a plaintiffs initial
showing has a stronger effect on the court's estimate of the proba-
bility of discrimination, a shift in the burden of persuasion might
be appropriate. This difference highlights the importance of a
careful assessment of the impact of Phase I evidence on probability
estimates in systemic disparate treatment cases and will be ex-
plored further in later parts.
II. ALLOCATING BURDENS OF PRODUCTION AND PERSUASION
IN CIVIL LITIGATION
As shown above, the systemic disparate treatment theory is a
method for plaintiffs to create an inference of discriminatory in-
tent-one of the required elements of a disparate treatment claim.
83. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Olur deci-
sions in Teamsters and Franks do indicate a recognition that presumptions shifting the
burden of persuasion based on evidentiary probabilities and the policies behind the statute
are not alien to our Title VII jurisprudence."); Lujan v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d
917, 929 (6th Cir. 1985); Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1984);
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and Presumptions in Indian
and American Civil Rights Law, 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 89, 110-11 (1999); Paul M. Secunda, A
Public Interest Model for Applying Lost Chance Theory to Probabilistic Injuries in Employment Discrim-
ination Cases, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 747, 768 n.123 (2005).
84. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. "If, as we noted in Teamsters, '[p]resumptions shifting the burden of proof are of-
ten created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's
superior access to the proof,' . .. one would be hard pressed to think of a situation where it
would be more appropriate to require the defendant to show that its decision would have
been justified by wholly legitimate concerns." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 273 (O'Connor,J.,
concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45).
86. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that in
a Teamsters situation, plaintiffs receive the benefit of a burden shift "based on the likelihood
that an illegitimate criterion was a factor in the individual employment decision").
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Teamsters provides an alternative to the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework for creating this inference of discriminatory
intent." Because the plaintiffs' required showing in a Teamsters
prima facie case is stronger than the required showing in a McDon-
nell Douglas prima facie case, the result is a shift in the burden of
persuasion rather than just the burden of production on the ques-
tion of discriminatory intent.89
Recognizing this operational role of the systemic disparate
treatment theory is critical to determining its proper scope and
application. The question highlighted by the areas of confusion
described in Part I.B. is: "In which cases (or categories of cases)
should statistical evidence of a 'pattern or practice' of discrimina-
tion be permitted to create an inference of discriminatory intent
and shift the burdens of production and persuasion on the ele-
ment of discriminatory intent from the plaintiff(s) to the
defendant?" This is fundamentally a question about allocating
burdens of proof. More specifically, it is a question about how the
burdens of production and persuasion on the question of discrim-
inatory intent should be allocated at an identifiable point in the
middle of the litigation: after Phase I evidence is presented and
considered, but before Phase II begins.
In order to better understand whether permitting (or prohibit-
ing) use of the systemic disparate treatment burden allocation
device is valid in any particular application in employment discrim-
ination law, it is logical to begin by considering how burdens of
production and persuasion are generally allocated in civil litiga-
tion.
A. Traditional Considerations
Traditional evidence and civil procedure scholars identified a
number of considerations for determining how to allocate the
burdens of proof in civil litigation." Of the four most commonly
asserted traditional burden allocation considerations, the two that
88. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358-60.
89. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
90. Unlike later law and economics scholars, the traditional doctrinal scholars did not
purport to set out a formula or equation for determining how the various considerations
should be weighted. See, e.g.,JAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.16, at 343 ("There is no a priori
test for allocating the burden of persuasion or the burden of producing evidence.");
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 3:3, at 430 ("[T]rial burdens are often allocated
by specific custom .... Beyond these customs, there are some broad notions that account
for the allocation of trial burdens."); cf Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in
Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997).
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prove most important in determining when discriminatory intent
should be inferred in systemic disparate treatment cases are the
same two identified in Teamsters and by Justice O'Connor in Pice
Waterhouse. (1) the parties' relative access to proof and (2) judicial
estimates of probabilitiesi'
1. The Party Seeking to Change the Status Quo
The first consideration proffered in the traditional literature is
that the party seeking to change the status quo should bear the ev-
identiary burdens. This explains why the burden of persuasion is
normally assigned to plaintiffs in civil litigation: "Perhaps the
broadest and most accepted idea is that the person who seeks court
action should justify the request, which means that the plaintiffs
bear the burdens on the elements of their claims."92
This is akin to a default rule in the traditional analysis. In the ab-
sence of some overriding consideration, the traditional analysis
provides that the burdens of persuasion and production ought to
be placed on the plaintiff, who is asking the court to disrupt the
status quo allocation of rights or property.
A key limitation of this consideration is that it informs only how
initial burdens should be allocated. Plaintiffs are always the ones
who set the machinery of the courts in motion, and are therefore
always the party asking for change from the status quo. This con-
sideration invariably points to placing the initial burdens on
plaintiffs; it offers no insight on what showings by plaintiff (made
during the litigation) might be sufficient to shift these initial bur-
dens onto defendant." This first consideration offers no useful
91. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 32, §§ 337, 343 (Edward W. Cleary, ed., 2d ed.
1972); JAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.8; 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAw § 2486 (James H. Chadbourn, ed., rev. 1981); see also 31A C.J.S. EVIDENCE
§§ 103-110, 112-113 (2010).
92. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 3:3, at 430; see also MCCORMICK, supra
note 32, § 337, at 786 ("The burdens of pleading and proof with regard to most facts have
been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state
of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof
or persuasion.").
93. This consideration explains why the initial burden in a systemic disparate treat-
ment case is on the plaintiffs to establish that the defendant employer engaged in a pattern
or practice of discrimination. Because the plaintiffs are seeking court intervention, they
should be required to provide some evidence to convince the court that action may be re-
quired. However, once the plaintiff has given the court some evidence that a change in the
status quo may be justified, then other burden allocation considerations should be consid-
ered. See generally Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 424-28 (noting that the default rule is to
place the burdens of proof on plaintiffs, and that certain recognized exceptions to the
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prescription for determining what types of showings, in what types
of systemic disparate treatment cases, should be sufficient to raise
an inference of discriminatory intent. For insight on that question,
other considerations must be examined.
2. Relative Access to Proof
A second consideration discussed in the traditional scholarship
is the parties' relative access to proof on the point in question. Pro-
fessors Mueller and Kirkpatrick write: "[B]urdens are allocated to
put them on the party most likely to be able to carry them, mean-
ing the party most likely to have access to the proof."9 4 Likewise,
Professor James writes: "[t]he burden of proof traditionally is
placed on the party having the readier access to knowledge about
the fact in question."95
Access to proof is specifically mentioned by the Teamsters Court
as a justification for shifting the burden of proof in appropriate
employment discrimination cases.9 Access to proof appears to be a
particularly important consideration in disparate treatment em-
ployment discrimination cases. The key element in disparate
default rule can be explained by examining considerations other than the costs of initiating
litigation).
94. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 3:3, at 432. For example, a debtor may
more readily prove payment of a debt than a creditor proving nonpayment of the debt. Id.
Policy reasons can sometimes override this consideration. Thus, a plaintiff ordinarily bears
the burden of proving defendant's negligence, but a defendant must prove plaintiffs con-
tributory negligence. "The explanation is that the party seeking relief must support the
request (so the plaintiff has a central burden), but we prefer to provide full recovery if neg-
ligence is shown unless the defendant provides good reasons to deny or reduce recovery by
showing that the plaintiff is all or partly at fault." Id. at 433. See also McCoRMICK, supra note
32, § 337, at 787 ("A doctrine often repeated by the courts is that where the facts with regard
to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving
the issue .... This consideration should not be overemphasized.").
95. JAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.16, at 344. Professor James notes that "[t]his con-
sideration, however, has never been controlling." Id. As contrary examples, Professor James
notes that that the plaintiffs usually have the burden of proving that defendant's conduct
was negligent in a negligence claim, proving that defendant committed breach in a contract
action, and proving the falsity of defendant's representations in a fraud claim. Id. See also id.
§ 7.17, at 349 ("Access to evidence is often the basis for creating a presumption. When goods
are damaged in a bailee's possession, for instance, the bailee can more easily find out what
happened to them than the bailor, so it is fair to presume the bailee's negligence as an ini-
tial matter and put the bailee to the production of exculpatory evidence, if any exists.").
96. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977) (citing
McCoRMICK, supra note 32, §§ 337, 343); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
273 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09
(1973) (discussing burden shifting in the context of school discrimination cases); James,
supra note 32, at 61 (describing burdens of proof as "handicaps" used against "disfavored
contentions").
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treatment cases is a showing of discriminatory intent-the element
on which Teamsters provides a mechanism for drawing an inference
in plaintiffs' favor. Proving that an employer's decision-maker acted
with an intentionally discriminatory motive is a particularly difficult
task for plaintiffs, given their lack of access to information on that
point.97
Commentators have sometimes minimized the importance of
this consideration in light of modern discovery rules, which pro-
vide for liberal exchange of information." Access to relevant
evidence, the argument goes, can be obtained through document
requests, depositions, and other discovery techniques."9 However,
this is less likely to be true in disparate treatment discrimination
cases, where the central issue is usually what was in the decision-
maker's mind when he took an adverse employment action against
the plaintiff. While modem discovery rules can complicate the
question of the parties' relative access to proof, it seems unlikely
that they can completely equalize the parties' ability to offer proof
on all factual questions-especially in disparate treatment cases.
The impact of modern discovery rules on information asymmetries
is discussed in detail, infra, Part II.B.
3. Estimates of Probabilities
Traditional evidence and procedure scholarship also recognizes
the importance of judicial estimates of which party's assertion was
most probably true or correct. Professor McCormick stated: "Per-
haps a more frequently significant consideration in the fixing of
the burdens of proof is the judicial estimate of the probabilities of
the situation. The risk of failure of proof may be placed upon the
party who contends that the more unusual event has occurred."'00
97. See Katz, supra note 45, at 881.
98. SeeJAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.16, at 344 ("Access to evidence is a much dimin-
ished basis for allocating burden of proof in modem liberal discovery."); see also Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1503 (1999) ("But
if, as a result of modern pretrial procedures for discovering evidence in the possession of the
opposing party, the costs of searching for evidence are symmetrical, the burden of produc-
tion should indeed be on the party that bears the burden of persuasion-that, is [sic] the
plaintiff in the case of the main claim but the defendant in the case of affirmative defenses
99. SeeJAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.16.
100. McCORMICK, supra note 32, § 337, at 787. Professor McCormick offers the follow-
ing example: "[W]here a business relationship exists, it is unlikely that services will be
performed gratuitously. The burden of proving a gift is therefore placed upon the one who
claims it. Where services are performed for a member of the family, a gift is much more
likely and the burden of proof is placed on the party claiming the right to be paid." Id.; see
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Mueller and Kirkpatrick agree, writing: "[B]urdens are allocated
to recognize what is probably true."'O' The judicial estimate of
probabilities is specifically mentioned as a consideration in shifting
the burden of proof in the pattern or practice context in Team-
sters, 12 and by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Price
Waterhouse.11
Judicial estimates of probabilities play a key role not only in ini-
tial burden allocations, but also in the operation and strength of
many different types of legal presumptions and inferences that are
employed after an initial showing by one party. "What is likely, for
instance, is often presumed." 4 Because "most letters, properly
sent, reach their destination" upon a showing that a letter is
properly mailed, the law will presume that it reached its destina-
tion. 1o5 Likewise, in the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff's
prima facie case is sufficient to rule out the two most common rea-
sons for an adverse employment action-that plaintiff did not
apply for an open position or was not qualified for it. This showing
by the plaintiff is sufficient to show an increase in the probability
that the adverse employment action was the product of discrimina-
tion, but it is not a strong enough showing to establish a very high
probability of discrimination. As a result, only the burden of pro-
duction is shifted under McDonnell Douglas, and the employer can
easily meet that burden by providing some evidence of a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action.'0 6 Where
the plaintiffs initial showing is stronger and makes the probability
of discrimination significantly higher, however, a shift in the bur-
den of persuasion may be justified.0 o
also Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L.
REv. 5, 13 (1959) (asserting that the judicial estimate of probabilities should consider liti-
gated cases as the baseline). But see V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and
Standards of Proof 14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 817-18 (1961) (arguing against the use of probabili-
ties in assigning the burden of persuasion).
101. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 3:3, at 433.
102. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977) (citing
MCCORMICK, supra note 32, §§ 337, 343; James, supra note 32, at 61; and Keyes v. Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973)).
103. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 273 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). -
104. JAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.17, at 348.
105. Id. at 348 n.19 (citing JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE 183 (1947) and
WIGMORE, supra note 91, § 2491).
106. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
107. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If, for example,
a plaintiff can establish that race was a "motivating factor," the probability of unlawful dis-
crimination is much higher (liability is established) and the burden of persuasion shifts to
the defendants to prove that there was an independently sufficient reason that motivated
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4. Substantive Policy and Disfavored Contentions
A final consideration discussed in the traditional evidence and
procedure literature is whether the law favors or disfavors one of
the parties' positions as a substantive policy matter.1 e8 For example,
the law generally disfavors claims of libel or slander involving mat-
ters of public interest in order to adequately protect freedom of
speech." Therefore, a public figure plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion on the matter of whether the alleged defamatory state-
ment was true or false, and must prove that the defendant acted
with "actual malice" regarding the truth or falsity of the state-
ment.o In this way, the burden of proof is "used as a handicap
against the disfavored contention."'
Another example is fraud, for which courts often require a
higher level of proof from plaintiff in order to satisfy the burden of
persuasion.'12 Likewise, many affirmative defenses may generally be
disfavored for substantive policy reasons, explaining why the bur-
den of persuasion is often placed on the defendant rather than the
plaintiff for those defenses."3 Substantive policies may also explain
courts' use of some legal presumptions to allocate or shift bur-
dens."14
"Substantive policy" is a broad label that can cover different
types of judicial considerations. It may be that there is a consensus
in the law that Type II errors (false negatives) should be favored
over Type I errors (false positives), or vice versa, for certain catego-
ries of cases." 5 This is likely the case in the context of the
them to take the adverse action in order to avoid damages. See id.; Civil Rights Act of 1991,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) (2) (B) (2006).
108. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 3:3, at 431 ("[B]urdens are allocated
to serve substantive policy, making it easier or harder for plaintiffs to recover or defendants
to avoid liability.").
109. JAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.16, at 345 ("Thus, the defendant in libel or slander
formerly was required to prove the truth of the objectionable words to escape liability. The
evolved interpretation of the First Amendment, however, requires plaintiff to prove the
falsity of a statement in news media about a subject of public interest.").
110. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964); see alsoJAMES ET
AL., supra note 70, § 7.16.
111. JAMES ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.16, at 345.
112. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 3:3, 431 ("Sometimes the policy is
more negative than positive, as is true of some disfavored or handicapped claims (such as
fraud) or defenses (such as statute of limitations), which are allocated as burdens on the
party who claims them and also sometimes made subject to heavier pleading and persuasion
burdens.").
113. See id.§ 3.3.
114. See id.
115. Criminal law is an example of a situation in which the law so heavily prefers Type H
errors (false acquittals) over Type I errors (false convictions) that we not only place the
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defamation and fraud examples described above. It may be better
that some defendants guilty of libel go unpunished in order to
provide breathing space for First Amendment freedoms. Likewise,
it may be preferable to err on the side of not finding fraud, absent
a high degree of confidence that fraud was actually committed,
because of the especially severe consequences to such defend-
ants."'6 In order to favor Type II errors over Type I errors, the law
uses burden allocation as an encumbrance against the disfavored
position. Unlike defamation and fraud, there is no apparent rea-
son to favor either Type I errors or Type II errors in employment
discrimination cases."' There is no consensus that there should be
a thumb on either side of the scale in discrimination suits.""
Alternatively, the label "substantive policy" may also describe sit-
uations in which the considerations at issue in altering the
ordinary burden allocations are really the parties' relative access to
information and judicial estimates of probabilities. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur and the alternative liability rule of Summers v. Tice"9
provide examples. In each of these situations, the law alters burden
allocations in some way, ostensibly for "policy" reasons, after plain-
tiff makes a certain evidentiary showing.o2 0
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can relieve the plaintiff from the
burden of proving the defendant's negligence if the plaintiff can
first show: (1) the defendant was in exclusive control of the in-
strument that led to plaintiffs injury, (2) the plaintiffs conduct did
not contribute to the injury, and (3) the injury could not ordinarily
occur without defendant's negligence."' Many jurisdictions charac-
terize this rule as permitting, but not requiring, the jury to
burden of persuasion on the prosecution, but we also require an especially high level of
proof: proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Posner, supra note 98, at 1504-05.
116. See Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof 72 IND. L.J. 651, 678 (1997).
117. Cf Posner, supra note 98, at 1504-05 ("In the typical civil trial, there is no basis for
supposing that Type I errors (false positives, such as convicting an innocent person) on
average impose higher costs than Type II errors (false negatives, such as an erroneous ac-
quittal). So it is enough to justify a verdict for the plaintiff that the probability that his claim
is meritorious exceeds, however slightly, the probability that it is not.").
118. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.04[B], at 178 ("While this outcome [favoring
Type II errors over Type I errors] may be appropriate in criminal law, where the primary
value is to not convict the innocent, there is no similar policy in civil litigation. The setting
of the standard of proof at the preponderance of evidence in-civil litigation means that
there is no important social value difference between finding an innocent defendant liable
and a guilty defendant not liable.").
119. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
120. SeeJAMES ET AL., supra note 70, at § 7.16; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263-64
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Summers as an example of shifting the burden of persua-
sion onto defendants).
121. SeeJAMES ET AL., supra note 70, at § 7.16 (referring to the Me ipsa loquitur doctrine
as a "substantively influenced rule of allocation.").
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presume or infer negligence once the plaintiff has made such a
showing.122
Likewise, the rule of alternative liability in cases like Summers can
alter the ordinary burden allocations in civil cases. Where the
plaintiff proves that his injury was caused by the negligence of one
of several tortfeasors, but cannot prove that the injury was more
likely than not the result of the negligence of any one particular
tortfeasor, the burden of persuasion shifts onto the defendants to
prove that they were not responsible for plaintiffs injuries. 2 3
The res ipsa loquitur and Summers alternative liability doctrines
can be explained by the defendants' superior access to proof of
negligence and the high probability that one of the defendants'
negligence caused the injury (given the showings made by plaintiff
to trigger the doctrines). The "substantive policy" reasons for disfa-
voring one party's position or the other's can often be collapsed
down into an analysis of access to information and probabilities.
Of the four burden allocation considerations discussed in the
traditional evidence and civil procedure scholarship, the two that
can best help determine the appropriate use of the systemic dis-
parate treatment theory to create an inference of discriminatory
intent are: (1) relative access to proof and (2) judicial estimates of
probabilities.
B. Law and Economics Analysis
Law and economics scholars approach burden allocation ques-
tions from a different perspective, and their insights can assist in
determining the efficient application of the systemic disparate
treatment theory. Economists have formally modeled the efficient
allocation of burdens of proof in civil litigation and offer a more
rigorous and detailed analysis of the key considerations. These
economic models, like the traditional analysis, point to the im-
portance of the parties' relative access to information and
estimates of probabilities.
122. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 154, at 370-71 (2000); see, e.g., Khan v.
Singh, 975 A.2d 389, 394 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2009) (the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "permits the
jury to infer negligence in certain circumstances, effectively reducing the plaintiffs burden
of persuasion, but not shifting the burden of proof.").
123. See DOBBS, supra note 122, § 175, at 426-27.
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1. The Hay and Spier Model: Information Costs and
Bayesian Probability Analysis
Professors Bruce Hay and Kathryn Spier, in a 1997 article enti-
tled Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective,
developed a formal model that is well-suited to analyzing systemic
disparate treatment law.124 Hay and Spier begin with a relatively
simple game theory model to evaluate litigants' dominant strate-
gies for presenting evidence to the court, 2' and determine that the
party bearing the burden of proof will present evidence on a dis-
puted issue of fact if and only if the evidence supports his position.
The party not bearing the burden of proof will refrain from pre-
senting evidence regardless of whether the evidence supports his
position. 2 6
Having modeled the parties' equilibrium behavior under alter-
nate burden assignments using game theory, Hay and Spier then
proceed to determine the optimal allocation of the burden of
proof given such predicted litigant behavior.'2 ' The stated goal of
124. See Hay & Spier, supra note 90.
125. The three simplifying assumptions of Hay & Spier's game theory model are: (1)
both parties have access to a body of evidence that, if presented to the court, indicates
whether the defendant acted unlawfully (the issue in the case), and both parties know what
that body of evidence contains; (2) the body of evidence is unitary in nature, such that the
court either sees all of it or none of it; and (3) a party's cost of presenting the evidence to
the court is low enough that he would choose to present the evidence on the issue if it is
necessary to do so in order for that party to obtain a favorable ruling. Id. at 416-17.
126. Id. at 418. This is demonstrated by the following analysis: If the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof of showing that X occurred (the defendant's unlawful activity), and the
parties are aware of the burden assignment, then the defendant's dominant strategy is to
not produce evidence. If the evidence shows that X occurred, then defendant will not offer
the evidence because it hurts his case and he would needlessly incur presentation costs by
offering the evidence. If the evidence shows that X did not occur, then the defendant will
also not offer the evidence, because he will prevail even if no evidence is offered, and save
the costs of presenting the evidence. If the evidence shows that X occurred, then plaintiff
will present the evidence in order to prevail (assuming that presentation costs are sufficient-
ly low, per assumption number 3). If the evidence shows that X did not occur, then plaintiff
will not present the evidence because it hurts his case and he would pointlessly incur presen-
tation costs. Id. at 417. The converse holds if the burden is assigned to the defendant. Id. at
417-18.
127. Hay & Spier assert that their model of the "burden of proof" allocation corre-
sponds to the burden of production, rather than the burden of persuasion, although they
acknowledge that the distinction between the production and persuasion burdens "is of
course blurry." Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 415 nn.3-4. However, as Professor Sanchirico
correctly points out, Hay & Spier are actually modeling an amalgam of both burdens.
Sanchirico supra note 70, at 281 ("The fact that the burdened party loses [in the Hay & Spi-
er model] when neither party presents any evidence resembles the effect of the production
burden. The fact that the burdened party loses when both parties present evidence resem-
bles the effect of the persuasion burden."). This simplified analysis of an amalgam of both
trial burdens at once is somewhat crude, but is also "standard in the economic literature on
legal process," and has also been used by Professor Sanchirico, see id. at 301 n.32, and Hyun
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the model is that "the court wants to assign the burden of proof to
minimize the expected costs of presenting evidence on whether X
occurred," where X represents the defendant's unlawful behavior. 12
Having this stated goal, Hay and Spier posit that the court
should give the plaintiff the burden of proof if, and only if, the fol-
lowing expression holds:
(probability that X occurred) x (plaintiffs costs of showing X
occurred) < (probability that X did not occur) x (defendant's
costs of showing X did not occur)
Because of the parties' equilibrium behavior, the left side of this
equation represents the expected costs of giving the burden to the
plaintiff, while the right side of the equation represents the ex-
pected costs of imposing the burden on defendant.'30 The factors
Hay and Spier identify as the key determinants of proper burden
of proof allocation are: (1) the probability of unlawful behavior
and (2) the costs to each party of accessing and presenting evi-
dence. These are the same two factors highlighted in the
traditional scholarship, and the same two factors that the Supreme
Court in Teamsters identified as justifying a shift in the burden of
proof. 131
a. The Parties' Relative Information Costs
The parties' relative information costs are the "costs of gathering
and presenting evidence on the contested issue." 3 2 If one party has
better access to the evidence on the question at issue in the case, or
a better ability to assemble and present the evidence at a lower
cost, then that party should (all other things being held equal) be
Song Shin, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration, 29 RAND J. EcON. 378, 380-
81 (1998). The formal modeling performed by Professor Hay in his related article, Allocating
the Burden of Proof likewise analyzes an amalgam of the burdens. See Hay, supra note 116, at
653-55.
128. Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 418.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 418-19. Because the burdened party will incur the presentation costs-if
any-only if the evidence supports that party's position, each side of the equation represents
the expected costs of placing the burden on that party. Thus, if the expected costs of placing
the burden on the plaintiff are less than the expected costs of placing the burden on de-
fendant, then the burden should be placed on plaintiff.
131. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977). See also
Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 419 n.10 ("These factors are widely recognized as the essential
ones in assigning the burden of proof on an issue.") (citingiJAMES ET AL., supra note 70, at
344-49 (4th ed. 1992)).
132. Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 419.
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given the burden of proof. In other words, "[o]ther things being
equal, the lower one party's relative costs, the stronger the argu-
ment for giving him the burden of proof."'3 3
Hay and Spier note that modem discovery rules can complicate
this question. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R.
Civ. P."), each party can request the production of evidence in the
other party's possession and depose the other parties' witnesses. 3 4
Judge Richard Posner, in his economic analysis of evidence law,
posits that modem pretrial discovery procedures can make the
costs of searching for evidence symmetrical. 3 5
Hay and Spier are less optimistic on this point. They note that if
the defendant has exclusive possession of the relevant evidence,
giving plaintiff the burden of proof may result in the defendant
complying with discovery rules by sending too much information,
forcing the plaintiff to sift through the piles to find relevant evi-
dence, thus incurring a real information cost.3 6 However, this is
only one way in which the Fed. R. Civ. P. might come up short in
equalizing asymmetrical information costs. An even more obvious
way, in the context of intentional employment discrimination, is
that reliable evidence of the decision-maker's true intent is essen-
tially impossible for a plaintiff to obtain using any of the discovery
tools. For example, the plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit is high-
ly unlikely to get a "guilty" decision-maker, even under oath in a
deposition, to admit that the actual reason he fired plaintiff is that
she is a woman. In the typical discrimination case, not only is direct
evidence of discriminatory intent solely within the defendant's pos-
session, it is also particularly elusive even under modern discovery
rules.
b. Probabilities and Signals
The second determinative factor is the probability that X (de-
fendant's unlawful behavior) occurred. In a discrimination case,
for example, X would represent the probability that the employer
actually discriminated against the plaintiff based on age, sex, race,
or other protected characteristic. Hay and Spier further refine the
probabilities factor by applying a Bayesian probability analysis.
They posit that the court begins with some information, or signal,
133. Id. at 419.
134. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
135. See Posner, supra note 98, at 1503.
136. See Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 419.
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about the case ().13' For example, in a discriminatory failure to
hire case where the plaintiff has successfully established a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the court would have the fol-
lowing information (or signal 3): that the plaintiff belonged to a
protected class, plaintiff was qualified for and applied for the open
position, plaintiff was not hired, and that a person from outside
the protected class was hired. The observation of such a signal al-
lows the court to refine or update its understanding of the
probability factor using Bayes' Rule. 138
The probability that X occurred (after taking into account the
observation of signal Y) can be represented as:
prob(IjX) x prob(X)
prob( Y)
In this expression, prob(YIX) represents the probability that the
court would observe signal Ygiven that Xoccurred, prob(X) repre-
sents the unconditional prior probability that X would occur, and
prob(Y) represents the unconditional prior probability of observ-
ing Y
Likewise, the probability that X did not occur (after taking into
account the observation of signal Y) can be represented as:
prob(YI-X) xprob(-X)
prob( Y)
In this expression, prob(YI-X) represents the probability that
the court would observe signal Y given that X did not occur,
prob (-X) represents the unconditional prior probability that X did
not occur, and prob( Y) represents the unconditional prior proba-
bility of observing Y 139
Returning to Hay and Spier's determinative expression for plac-
ing the burden, substituting the foregoing refinements for the
probability that X occurred (or did not occur) and simplifying, the
following expression obtains:
137. For purposes of analyzing pattern or practice burden-shifting, I will assume that
signal Y is the observation of statistical evidence suggesting that a prohibited independent
variable (i.e., race, sex, or other protected classifications) was a statistically significant pre-
dictor of the adverse employment action. See discussion infra Part III-IV
138. For a further discussion and defense of Bayesian probability analysis in the analysis
of evidence, see Richard D. Friedman, "E" is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87
VA. L. REV. 2029, 2041-45 (2001). For a recent argument in favor of application of Bayesian
probability analysis to the interpretation of contracts, see Yair Listokin, Bayesian Contractual
Interpretation, 39J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (2010).
139. See Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 419-20 (setting out these expressions).
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prob(YIX) x prob(X) x (plaintiffs costs of showing that X
occurred) <
prob(Y|~X) x prob(-X) x (defendant's costs of showing that X
did not occur)
Thus, the burden of proof should be placed on the plaintiff if
and only if the foregoing expression holds.14 0 Simplifying from the
Hay and Spier expression, there are three key factors that deter-
mine how to allocate the burdens of proof:
(1) Prior Probability: (prob(X)) as compared to
(prob(-X)). The prior, unconditional likelihood
that X occurred, as compared to the prior, uncondi-
tional likelihood that X did not occur, before
considering any evidence in the case. All else held
equal, the higher (prob(X)), the stronger the ar-
gument for placing the burden on defendant.
Conversely, all else held equal, the higher
(prob(-X)) the stronger the argument for placing
the burden on plaintiff.
(2) Evidentiary Signak (prob(YIX)) as compared to
(prob(YI~X)). The probability that the court would
observe signal Y if X did occur, as compared to the
probability that the court would observe that same
signal Y if X did not occur. All else held equal, the
higher (prob( YIX)), the stronger the argument for
placing the burden on defendant. Conversely, all
else held equal, the higher (prob(YI-X)), the
stronger the argument for placing the burden on
plaintiff.
(3) Information Costs- The relative costs facing each party
in searching for, finding, and presenting evidence
that X did (or did not) occur. All else held equal,
the higher plaintiffs relative information costs,
compared to the defendant's, the stronger the ar-
gument for placing the burden on defendant, and
vice-versa.
The results of the Hay and Spier model reinforce -the im-
portance of relative access to proof and estimates of probabilities
in allocating burdens. The key difference from the traditional
analysis is that the probabilities factor is further refined, using
140. See Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 423.
830 [VOL. 44:4
The Telltale Sign ofDiscrimination
Bayes' theorem, into two components: a prior probability and an
update to the prior.
The Hay and Spier model, by utilizing Bayesian probability anal-
ysis, is particularly well suited to addressing systemic disparate
treatment cases. In a systemic disparate treatment case, the court
must decide, at an identifiable point in the middle of the litigation
and after the initial burden assignment, whether to permit an in-
ference of discriminatory intent and shift the burden of persuasion
to the defendant. In other words, the court will have an opportuni-
ty to consider some evidence (the Phase I evidence, usually
statistical evidence) and update its estimate of probabilities based
on this evidentiary signal. By incorporating the Bayesian concept of
probability updating, the Hay and Spier model provides an excel-
lent framework for analyzing systemic disparate treatment cases.
2. Economic Analysis Confirms the Importance
of Traditional Considerations
The Hay and Spier model is a theoretical tool meant to sharpen
analysis and provide a framework for thinking about the costs and
benefits of allocating burdens of proof to one party or the other in
given situations. Certainly, not every assumption underlying the
model will hold true in every case. Moreover, it is essentially impos-
sible for a court or policy-maker to assign specific values to any of
the variables in the equation with any degree of mathematical pre-
cision. Nobody can attach specific values, with absolute certainty, to
the variables (prob (X)), (prob (-X)), or identify with precision
the difference in the information presentation costs of plaintiff
and defendant.
Nevertheless, the Hay and Spier model provides useful guidance
in allocating burdens of proof in systemic disparate treatment dis-
crimination cases. The model reinforces the importance of the
parties' relative access to information and estimates of probabili-
ties. The model identifies the three key factors that should be
essential in determining whether a shift in the burden of persua-
sion, or permitting an inference of discriminatory intent, would
tend to reduce the overall costs of accurately resolving the dispute.
The economic model can serve as a theoretical guide in systemic
disparate treatment cases, despite its inherent assumptions and the
mathematical imprecision in its application.
141. In a separate paper, Professor Hay further addresses many of the underlying as-
sumptions and simplifications in the basic model. See Hay, supra note 116, at 665-73. Hay
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As the Teamsters Court stated, "[p]resumptions shifting the bur-
den of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of
probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to the
proof."'42 Economic modeling reinforces the importance of proba-
bilities and information asymmetries. 4 3
III. APPLICATION IN INDIVIDUAL CASES: ANALYZING PROBABILITIES
AND INFORMATION COSTS IN THE SYSTEMIC DISPARATE
TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION SETTING
Having identified the three key factors for proper allocation and
shifting of the burdens of production and persuasion, Part III con-
siders how each of the key factors is likely to arise in a systemic
disparate treatment case. Case characteristics that courts should
look for when determining whether to draw an inference of dis-
criminatory intent in any particular case are identified.
A. Prior Probabilities in Disparate Treatment Cases
The first factor for analysis is the prior probability that discrimi-
nation occurred against any particular individual claimant
(prob(X)) as compared to the prior probability of nondiscrimina-
tion (prob(-X)), before considering the statistical evidence in the
case. In the discrimination context, the question is: How prevalent
is the type of discrimination alleged by the plaintiff-knowing
nothing else about the employer, the plaintiff, or the circumstanc-
es? Critics of the use of statistical evidence in systemic employment
discrimination cases charge that this factor is too often completely
overlooked in courts' interpretation of proffered statistical evi-
models the effect of introducing the possibility of settlement between the parties, the signals
sent by the parties' litigation decisions, and the possibility of litigant uncertainty about what
the evidence shows. See id. Because of these modifications, Hay concludes that three other
variables might factor into the efficient allocation of burdens of proof: (1) the amount at
stake for the party, (2) the social cost of error against the party, and (3) the party's "opti-
mism," or level of confidence that the evidence will support her position. See id. However,
none of these three factors change the basic conclusions from the Hay & Spier model.
142. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n. 45 (1977)(citing
McCORMICK, supra note 32, §§ 337, 343 andJames, supra note 32, at 61).
143. This may be an example of what Professor Richard Lempert described as "com-
mon sense on stilts." See Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common
Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REv. 1619, 1623 (2001). It may be that common sense arrived at the
"just" and "fair" result of focusing on probabilities and access to information when drawing
inferences, and only later did economic analysis demonstrate that this result was also effi-
cient. However, the model's emphasis on Bayesian probability updating can provide a new
perspective in systemic disparate treatment cases.
832 [VOL. 44:4
SUMMER 2011] The Telltale Sign of Discnimination
dence.'m Courts in discrimination cases sometimes fall victim to
what some commentators describe as a "statistical fallacy"-
interpreting the results of binomial distribution analysis or regres-
sion analysis incorrectly by failing to explicitly take into account
the prior, unconditional probability of X. 4 5
These critics are correct, to the extent that they argue prior
probabilities cannot simply be ignored in the interpretation of sta-
tistical evidence. In order to make informed estimates of
probabilities, the prior probability must be considered. But deter-
mining with a high degree of confidence the prior probability of
(X) in discrimination cases is unquestionably difficult. Courts,
scholars, and social scientists would likely disagree about the inci-
dence of intentional discrimination in today's workplaces. 4 7 It
would be unsurprising if some would estimate (prob(X)) as high as
.9 for certain types of discrimination, while others might put it as
low as .001. The possibility of discrimination resulting from purely
144. See Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies", 68
WASH. L. REv. 477, 488 (1993) ("In the discrimination context, the probability that an em-
ployer's work-force disparities are a consequence of chance is completely dependent upon a
statistic which the courts never have: the likelihood of discrimination prior to making the
employment decision. Although one might attempt some estimate of the percentage of
employers who engage in systematic discrimination, the estimate could be no more than the
crudest approximation.") 'While Browne is correct that an estimate of priors will necessarily
be a crude approximation, that does not render statistical evidence useless. As shown below,
arriving at a crude approximation of the prior is possible. In any event, estimating a prior is
a problem for the consideration of any type of circumstantial evidence; not just for statistical
analyses.
145. See id. at 490-92. Courts will sometimes incorrectly interpret statistical significance
at the .05 level to mean that the observed imbalanced distribution in the workplace (of, for
example, minority hires) would be due to chance only 5% of the time, and that there is
therefore a 95% chance the observed distribution was caused by some other "suspicious"
factor-namely, discrimination. See id.; see also Meier et al., supra note 30, at 148 (noting the
same statistical fallacy). This interpretation fails to adequately consider the prior, uncondi-
tional probability of discrimination. If, by hypothesis, the alleged type of discrimination (in
this example, discrimination against minorities in hiring) occurs only .01% of the time over-
all, then the probability that the observed distribution of minority hires for this employer
was due to chance is actually much higher than 5%. An accurate assessment of probabilities
must take into account both the statistical evidence (whether that be in the form of binomi-
al distributions or regression analysis) and the relevant prior, unconditional probability.
146. See Browne, supra note 144, at 488 (calling the prior, unconditional probability "a
statistic which the courts never have").
147. See generally Calloway, supra note 30 (arguing that courts are overly skeptical about
the prevalence of race discrimination); Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach As Antidiscnim-
ination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 854-57 (2007) (discussing
empirical evidence that shows discriminatory bias in the workplace remains a widespread
problem, although discrimination is now more implicit and "behind the scenes" than in
decades past); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA.
L. REv. 555, 561-69 (2001) (courts' biases may cause them to be overly skeptical about the
prevalence of discrimination).
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structural or unconscious biases in the workplace may complicate
this estimation even further.1 4 8
But courts do have some information about (prob(X)) before the
case begins. They have two items of information. First, they know
the parties are litigating. The fact that the parties have not been
able to reach agreement without resorting to litigation and have
expended the resources to collect and present evidence at Phase I
of the case sends at least some signal to the court about the case,
before any other evidence is considered. There is some reason to
believe that (prob(X)) and (prob(-X)) are at least reasonably close
to .5 each.'4 9 If the probabilities were at either extreme, then the
case would be a likely candidate for settlement. Of course, this is
not a satisfactory estimate. But it is at least one indicator available
to the court of the relative prior likelihood of X 150
The second, and more specific, item of information courts have
about (prob(X)) is a body of empirical research on the success
rates of plaintiffs in federal employment discrimination litigation.
Professors Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab have studied the
rates of success for plaintiffs in federal employment litigation at the
trial and appellate levels, and compared them with similar statistics
148. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about whether current antidiscrimina-
tion laws are effective against structural discrimination. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2006); Tristin K
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003). If structural discrimination is unlawful under
current antidiscrimination laws, then the estimate of the prior, unconditional probability
that X (unlawful discrimination) occurred would arguably need to be adjusted upward ac-
cordingly.
149. See Posner, supra note 98, at 1507. A reasonable guess, in light of this information
and only this information, might put (prob(X)) somewhere between, say, .3 and .7. Viewing
the problem from a defense perspective, however, one might argue that because plaintiffs
have an incentive to bring nonmeritorious claims in order to extract a settlement, a better
guess would be that (prob(X)) falls between, say, .05 and .4. A pro-plaintiff view might argue
the contrary, asserting that it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs with weak claims to find an
attorney willing to bring the case before a court. Under that view, one might estimate
(prob(X)) as falling somewhere between, say, .6 and .9. This range of possible opinions
about prior probabilities highlights the difficulty of stating (prob(X)) with any mathematical
precision, but it does not detract from the analytical power of the model. See generally Ra-
mona L. Paetzold, Problems with Statistical Significance in Employment Discrimination Litigation,
26-NEW ENG. L. REv. 395, 413-14 ("Although itlhas often-been argued in many contexts that
frequentist procedures should be preferred because, not requiring the injection of prior
beliefs, they are more 'objective,' the fact remains that virtually any decision rule that a fre-
quentist employs is a Bayesian decision rule with respect to some assignment of prior
probabilities. Simply pretending that prior beliefs are not being used does not make them
or their effects go away. . . .") (footnote omitted).
150. Professor Browne does not consider the possibility that the prior unconditional
probability may be affected by the signal to the court from the parties' litigation decisions.
See Browne, supra note 144.
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for other types of federal litigation.' In their most recent study,
they found that for the years 1998-2006, the win rate for Title VII
plaintiffs in federal district court was 10.88%, as compared with
9.12% for ADA plaintiffs, 11.67% for ADEA plaintiffs, and 10.96%
for Section 1981 race discrimination plaintiffs.15 2 Over the period
from 1979-2006, plaintiffs in all types of federal employment cases
won only about 15% of the time, while plaintiffs in other types of
federal litigation won approximately 51% of the time.1'5 For cases
actually reaching trial, the win rates were approximately 28% for
employment plaintiffs, compared to 45% for other federal plain-
tiffs.'5 4 These numbers can help give courts a basis for estimating
(prob(X))."5
But using these win rate numbers as a rough gauge of (prob(X))
is not a perfect solution, either. Perhaps, as Clermont and Schwab
and others have suggested, the win rates are much lower for plain-
tiffs in employment cases not because the claims are less likely to
be meritorious, but because of some unique difficulty in overcom-
ing certain types of hurdles or roadblocks in employment
discrimination litigation, such as pretrial motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment.'5 If that were the case, then the
win rates might significantly understate the true (prob(X)). On the
other hand, perhaps the win rates are lower in employment cases
simply because those suffering adverse employment actions are
more willing than other types of plaintiffs to bring non-meritorious
151. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse, 3 HARV. L. & POt'Y REv. 103 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont
& Schwab, From Bad to Worse); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 429 (2004) [hereinafter
Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court]; see also Kevin M.
Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7
Emp. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 547 (2003).
152. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 151, at 117.
153. Id. at 127.
154. Id. at 129. The movement of the win-rate toward 50% in cases reaching trial com-
ports with Judge Posner's view that one-sided cases are more likely settled, leaving cases on
the trial docket more likely to be toss-ups. Posner, supra note 98, at 1507.
155. Because these win rate numbers are based on individual discrimination cases, ra-
ther than on systemic cases, using them to determine when burdens should shift under
Teamsters would not have an endogenous feedback effect on the win rates. Cf Sanchirico,
supra note 70, at 275 (expressing concern that using estimates of probabilities in the deter-
mination of burden allocation is susceptible to a "troubling circularity.").
156. See Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court, supra
note 151, at 127 ("But perhaps [plaintiffs' lack of success] results from hurdles being placed
before employment discrimination plaintiffs."); Selmi, supra note 147 (arguing that various
biases can affect courts considering discrimination claims, thus skewing success rates down-
ward); see also Calloway, supra note 30 (arguing that courts have, mistakenly, become
skeptical about the prevalence of racial discrimination in the workplace).
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claims." If that were true, then the win rates might be an accurate
reflection of the true (prob(X)), or might even overstate the true
(prob(X)).
Further empirical study could lead to a better understanding of
what these win rates reflect, and how courts should approach the
problem of estimating the prior probability that X occurred. In
particular, empirical studies that could effectively gauge the rela-
tive prevalence of the various types of discrimination (age, sex,
race, disability, etc.) in the workplace might provide a more useful
starting point for estimating (prob(X)), and a better basis for de-
termining the proper extent of the systemic disparate treatment
theory. If courts or legislators have some reason to believe that
(prob(X)) is significantly lower for certain types of discrimination
(for example, age discrimination or disability discrimination) than
it is for other types (for example, the type of race discrimination at
issue in Teamsters), then that difference should be taken into ac-
count in determining whether the systemic disparate treatment
method of proof is appropriate for those types of cases.
Despite the difficulties in estimating prior probabilities, courts
considering systemic disparate treatment claims cannot simply ig-
nore the prior probability that X (unlawful discrimination)
occurred when making probability estimates and burden allocation
decisions. 158 They should use what information is available to them
and attempt to gauge a prior probability before updating that
probability with the evidentiary signals they observe. In particular,
the statistical evidence typically offered in Phase I of a systemic dis-
parate treatment case cannot be viewed in a vacuum, without
reference to an estimate of the prior probability of discrimination.
B. The Reference Class Problem
A particular problem in estimating prior probabilities is high-
lighted by the varying win rates presented in subpart A and is
157. This might be because plaintiffs suffering an adverse employment action, such as
job termination, are more likely to be desperate for money, and more likely to have already
severed their business association with the defendant (often the plaintiffs former employ-
er).
158. See Paetzold, supra note 149, at 412-14 (urging a complete statistical revolution in
antidiscrimination law, from the traditional frequentist statistical analysis to a Bayesian statis-
tical approach). My proposal can be thought of as a hybrid approach, whereby the results of
a traditional frequentist statistical analysis, such as a binomial distribution or a multiple
regression analysis, can represent a piece of evidence or an input (like a fingerprint or a
DNA match analysis) that can, in turn, be thought about in a Bayesian way, as advocated by
scholars like Richard Friedman. See Friedman, supra note 138.
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worthy of special attention: the reference class problem. Assume
that the court is considering a pattern or practice claim of sexual
discrimination against females, where the defendant employer is a
trucking company. To what class of cases should the court refer
when estimating the prior probability that unlawful discrimination
occurred?
Should the court, when estimating the prior probability, look to:
(a) the probability of unlawful discrimination of any kind in the
employment environment generally; (b) the probability of unlaw-
ful discrimination on the basis of sex in the employment
environment generally; (c) the probability of unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in the trucking industry; (d) the probability
of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex in the trucking in-
dustry in cases that reach litigation; or (e) the probability of
unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex in the trucking industry
in cases reaching trial; or any number of other plausible reference
classes? Any one of these reference classes might be appropriate,
and the choice of reference class could have a significant effect on
the court's estimate of the prior probability.'" For example, the
overall discrimination rate against females in the workplace in the
U.S. might be .001, while the discrimination rate against females in
industries traditionally dominated by males may be much higher,
say .05. Moreover, the discrimination rate against females in cases
that get to litigation might be .2, while the rate in cases that make
it to trial may be .5. The choice of reference class will have a signif-
icant effect on (prob(X)), and therefore on the court's ultimate
estimate of probabilities. "
159. For further discussion of the reference class problem, see Ronald J. Allen & Mi-
chael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models ofEvidence, 36J. LEGAL STUD. 107,
114-16 (2007). For a broader discussion about the propriety of using formal probability
theory to explain civil trial decision-making, see Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil
Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401 (1986) (arguing that civil trials would better comport with formal
probability theories if reconceptualized as contests between two competing, but fully speci-
fied, versions of the relevant facts); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Lieter, Naturalized Epistemology
and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REv. 1491, 1527-28 (2001) (arguing that relative plausibil-
ity theory better explains the legal fact-finding process than probability theory), and
Friedman, supra note 138 (responding to Allen and Lieter).
160. This is the dilemma identified by Cleary, who posited that probabilities in litigated
cases make a more appropriate baseline than probabilities of a situation in general. Cleary,
supra note 100, at 13. Note that the reference class problem affects traditional frequentist
statistical analysis as well. Thus, in Hazelwood, a significant question was determining the
proper comparison population for conducting a binomial distribution analysis. Meier et al.,
supra note 30, at 146.
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No one has yet devised a convincing solution to the reference
class problem that works across all contexts.'' Some contend that
the reference class problem renders the value of any Bayesian
mathematical models of evidence law "limited."' 2 In some cases,
the reference class problem appears intractable; there is no obvi-
ously "best" choice among several possible reference classes.
However, in other cases the problem may be manageable. For ex-
ample, in deciding whether to use the probability of discrimination
in society in general or the probability of discrimination in em-
ployment cases reaching litigation, it appears that choosing the
former reference class is really just electing to ignore probative and
available information about the case for no good reason.'" Gener-
ally speaking, the more specific the information used to define the
reference class, the better its use as a basis for estimating probabili-
ties'6-at least for purposes of considering the application of the
systemic disparate treatment doctrine.6 5
While it may not always be possible to locate the "best" reference
class from the universe of all possible reference classes, in the con-
text of our adversarial legal system choosing the "better" reference
161. For a proposed practical solution to the reference class problem for purposes of
selecting a reference class for use in our adversarial legal system, see Edward K. Cheng, A
Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 2081 (2009).
162. Allen & Pardo, supra note 159, at 107; Cheng, supra note 161, at 2083-84.
163. This may explain why Cleary believed that reference to probabilities in litigated
cases was a superior baseline to probabilities of a situation in general. See Cleary, supra note
100. Using cases reaching trial (rather than just reaching litigation) may be inappropriate,
however, because pattern or practice cases arguably do not fall within that reference class. At
the time the burden-shifting decision is made in a pattern or practice case, the presentation
of Phase I evidence has been completed, but the presentation of evidence on the individual
claims (Phase II) has not yet commenced. There remains an opportunity for settlement of
claims before the individual trials. A more conservative estimate of (prob(X)) based on the
reference class of cases reaching litigation therefore seems more appropriate.
164. There is, however, a risk of overfitting, which refers to the use of highly detailed
and specific information to arrive at a very small reference class that is defined by a number
of very unique characteristics, and which is therefore unlikely to be a good representation of
the true prior probability. See Cheng, supra note 161, at 2093 (likening the problem of over-
fitting in reference class selection to the problem of overfitting in statistical model
selection). At least for the present time, that risk appears to be minimal in the context of
employment discrimination, given the lack of available data. There is little data available
about the frequency of unlawful discrimination in the workplace in general, let alone highly
stratified data analyzing discrimination frequency in specific industries or specific geograph
ic locations. See id. at 2097-98 (noting that the availability of datasets provides a practical
limitation on the universe of potential reference classes that legal adversaries can "dream
up").
165. Unlike some of the mathematical models critiqued by Allen and Pardo, the analy-
sis herein is not aimed at assigning a specific, objective, and "correct" mathematical value to
any individual piece of evidence. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 159, at 130 (acknowledging
that Bayesian models can be used for "less problematic purposes" when arguments do not
depend on assertions of the "true or correct probative value of evidence.").
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class may be possible by viewing the choice of reference class as an
exercise in model selection. Each side can present to the court its
chosen reference class and advocate for it by explaining how it bet-
ter "fits" the question at issue. The court can then choose which
reference class is "better," and come up with its rough estimate of
the prior probability (prob(X)) accordingly.'"6
C. Statistical Signaling in Systemic Disparate Treatment Cases
"Statistics per se cannot ascertain whether employment discrimination
exists .... But statistical testing is, we would argue, a useful bench
mark. "167
The second key factor to examine is the evidentiary signal:
(prob(YX)) as compared to (prob(YI-X)). For our purposes, the
evidentiary signal (J) is the evidence observed by the court at
Phase I of a pattern or practice case. In the typical pattern or prac-
tice case, the Phase I evidence is primarily statistical evidence.'6s
Without question, the majority of the controversy surrounding sys-
temic disparate treatment cases center on how to properly
consider, interpret, and weigh statistical evidence suggesting
discrimination. Although the use of statistics in systemic discrimi-
nation cases is now commonplace, the propriety of shifting
burdens of proof onto defendants based primarily upon statistical
analyses is still disputed.
Statistical evidence can provide a "signal" (1) for updating prior
probabilities in order to permit courts to make estimates of poste-
rior probabilities, and in turn, determine whether a shift of the
burden of persuasion is appropriate. Statistical evidence comes in a
variety of forms, but this subpart focuses on two types of statistical
166. See Cheng, supra note 161, at 2096-97.
167. Meier et al., supra note 30, at 162-63 (emphasis omitted).
168. Non-statistical evidence in pattern or practice cases may also be evaluated using this
framework; for example, if there is undisputed evidence that an employer has an express, an-
nounced policy of discrimination (e.g., "Females may not be hired"), then that evidence can be
plugged in as the evidentiary signal (1). In the example given, (prob(11X)) = 1, or at least some
figure approaching 1, for any female applicant, and (prob(F|-X) = 0. But see Bates v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (Teamsters burden-shifting framework is
unnecessary where the case involves an employer's facially discriminatory policy, because the
fact to be uncovered by the burden-shifting scheme has already been admitted). Disputed
evidence of an unspoken or unwritten employer policy of discrimination might be evaluated in
a similar manner, although that would require factoring in credibility determinations by the
factfinder. See generally EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1285 (testimony of mul-
tiple statements made by management could be evidence of a facially discriminatory policy,
even though there was no formally announced facially discriminatory policy).
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evidence most commonly offered in systemic employment discrim-
ination cases: binomial distributions'69 and regression analyses."o
At the outset, it is important to recognize that these two fre-
quentist statistical techniques do not provide exactly the
information that courts need to update their prior probabilities.
The two values of most significance are (prob(11X)), the probabil-
ity of observing the evidentiary signal when assuming unlawful
discrimination, and (prob(YJ-X)), the probability of observing the
evidentiary signal when assuming no discrimination (i.e., a false
positive in the statistical evidence)."' These represent the infor-
mation the court needs to update its priors and make probability
estimates.
By contrast, binomial distributions and multiple regressions pro-
vide only the likelihood that the observed distribution or
regression coefficient would be observed, assuming random selec-
tion. In other words, binomial distribution and regression analyses
can provide information only about (prob(Flrandom selection)).
This is not precisely the same as (prob(YL-X)), because we would
not expect that nondiscriminatory employment decisions would
necessarily be the same as random employment decisions.'7 2 None-
theless, even those scholars with reservations about overreliance on
statistical evidence acknowledge that models of random selection
can still provide a useful benchmark for comparison purposes.'7 3 For
practical reasons, it is reasonable to assume that the two are at least
closely related. If random decisions could have easily led to the ob-
served distribution or regression coefficient (i.e., the
169. See Meier et al., supra note 30; Paul Meier, Damned Liars and Expert Witnesses, 81 J.
AM. STAT. Ass'N 269, 271 (1986); see also Browne, supra note 144, 479-82 (criticizing the use
of binomial distributions as evidence of discrimination).
170. See Delores A. Conway & Harry V. Roberts, Regression Analyses in Employment Discrim-
ination Cases, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW 107 (Morris H. DeGroot et al. ed., 1986). Compare
D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REv. 533 (2008)
(criticizing the continued use of regression analyses in employment discrimination cases
and urging utilization of a more recently-developed statistical technique, known as potential
outcomes, which manipulates observational data in a way that is designed to approximate a
controlled experiment, from which inferences of causation might be drawn); with Steven L.
Willborn & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics is a Plural Word, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 48 (2009)
(responding to Griener by arguing that regression and potential outcomes analyses are both
useful-techniques, yet both flawed in different ways).
171. See supra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the derivation of the signal comparison (Y/X to
YI-X) in the Hay & Spier model).
172. See Meier et al., supra note 30, at 153.
173. Id. at 25 ("Although hiring is not a process of random selection, it is not unreason-
able to compare it to such a benchmark process. If the disparity between black and white
hire rates is so small that it could have arisen by random sampling from an appropriate
population, then it seems reasonable to conclude that the statistics, by themselves, provide
no evidence of discrimination.").
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(prob(ljrandom selection)) is very high), then it can be assumed
an employer's nondiscriminatory decisions could likewise have
easily led to the observed distribution or coefficient (i.e.,
(prob(YI-X)) is also high).
The most commonly accepted test for statistical significance for
both binomial distribution and regression analysis is .05 (or, signif-
icance at the 5% level)." If the (prob(llrandom selection)) < .05,
the results are usually said to be "statistically significant." Using
random selection as a benchmark for nondiscrimination, it may be
reasonable to assume that, in such a case, (prob(Y-X)) is also rea-
sonably likely to be less than .05.
The other variable of interest from the Hay and Spier model is
(prob(YIX)). That is, the probability of observing (Y) given an as-
sumption that the employer did unlawfully discriminate (X). In
what percentage of cases would we expect to see the observed sta-
tistical evidence of disparity if the employer were actually
discriminating? In what percentage of cases would we expect false
negatives? The relationship between (prob(YJ-X)) and
(prob(YIX)) is complicated, but one statistician has estimated that
where statistical significance is set to the 5% level, the probability
of observing a false negative is approximately .5.75 Thus,
(prob(YIX)) is approximately .5. In the case of observed statistical
evidence showing statistical significance at the 5% level, it is there-
fore reasonable to assume that (prob(YIX)) is substantially higher
than (prob( YI-X)), which is likely to be less than .05.176
174. See Posner, supra note 98, at 1510-11. As Judge Posner notes, "The five percent test
is a convention employed in academic research, though not one to which the research
community adheres rigidly. Social scientists often report results that are significant only at
the ten percent level. And if the results are significant at the two percent or one percent
level, the social scientist will point out that these results are more robust than those that are
significant only at the five percent level; they are 'highly significant' rather than just 'signifi-
cant.' There is no magic to the five percent criterion . .. ." Id. at 1511.
175. John M. Dawson, Scientific Investigation of Fact-The Role of the Statistician, 11 FORUM
896, 907-08 (1976); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 178 ("Although the risks of
Type I and Type II errors are inversely related in that increasing one decreases the other,
they are not simple complements .... One statistician has created a model for an employ-
ment discrimination case by setting the risk of Type I error at 5 percent. With the
confidence level at 95 percent, he estimated the risk of Type II error to be approximately 50
percent." (citing Dawson, supra)).
176. Hay & Spier suggest just such a result in the context of an ordinary McDonnell
Douglas framework for individual discrimination cases. They note that, "[r]oughly speaking,
if the plaintiffs can show they were treated differently from a group of similarly situated male
employees [by establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas], the defendant must
come forward with evidence that the plaintiff was not fired for discriminatory reasons. In
such a setting, prob(YX) is relatively high compared to prob (YI-X) .... " Hay & Spier,
supra note 90, at 427 (footnote omitted).
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D. Information Asymmetries in Disparate Treatment Cases
The third and final key factor in burden allocation is an assess-
ment of relative access to information on the fact in question. This
is represented as the cost to plaintiff of showing that X occurred, as
compared to the cost to defendant of showing that X did not occur.
As noted above, procedural discovery rules can complicate this
question, and their effect should be taken into account to the ex-
tent possible.
Employment discrimination cases vary, but in the typical dispar-
ate treatment discrimination case plaintiff alleges that the
employer intentionally took some adverse employment action
against plaintiff because of plaintiffs membership in a protected
class. In other words, the employer made a decision to not hire,
not promote, terminate, or pay less compensation to, the plaintiff
because of her sex, race, religion, age, or other protected charac-
teristic. The critical factual question in most disparate treatment
cases is not whether plaintiff suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion, but rather whether the employer acted with a discriminatory
intent."' It is on this factual question that the shifting of the bur-
den of production and/or persuasion can be critical.
It will often be the case, in the disparate treatment context, that
the defendant will have better access to the evidence on the rele-
vant point. Usually the information about why employment
decisions are made is exclusively in the possession of the employer
and its agents."" The relevant decision-maker will likely know the
true reason for the adverse action, and that information may be
reflected in the employer's documents, such as personnel files or
possibly notes kept by the decision-maker. Generally speaking, em-
ployers will have better access to evidence than plaintiffs will in the
disparate treatment context.1 7 9 Although liberal discovery may less-
en this information asymmetry somewhat, it seems unlikely that it
177. This has been described as a "causation" requirement for disparate treatment cas-
es. See Katz, supra note 45, at 860 ("Almost all disparate treatment statutes include an
element of causation. They do not prohibit adverse employment actions, such as firing, in
all instances. Rather, they prohibit adverse employment actions only where those actions
occur 'because of a protected characteristic, such as race, sex, or age. In other words, these
statutes all require causation.") (footnote omitted); Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incolier-
ence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489 (2006).
178. See Katz, supra note 45, at 881 ("Causation occurs in the mind of the decision-
maker/defendant. And most of the relevant evidence tends to be under the control of the
defendant. This lack of access to evidence makes proving any type of causation difficult, and
therefore makes burden-shifting normatively desirable.").
179. See id. at 881; Hay & Spier, supra note 90, at 427 ("[I]n addition, the employer has
lower costs of producing evidence on the motive for the discharge.").
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would completely equalize the parties' relative access to infor-
mation.80
Interestingly, courts considering the application of the Teamsters
burden-shifting doctrine often fail to consider the parties' relative
access to information and instead focus only on the quality of, or
flaws in, the statistical or other evidence offered by plaintiffs to
show a pattern or practice of discrimination.18 ' These courts are
overlooking a key component of the inquiry. Because the question
is whether to shift the burdens of production and persuasion onto
the defendant, courts should consider not only how the statistical
evidence affects the probabilities, but also the asymmetries in ac-
cess to information inherent in the element of discriminatory in-
intent.
E. Illustration: A Hypothetical Application to a Single
Systemic Disparate Treatment Case
The foregoing framework can be used by courts to determine
whether burden-shifting is appropriate in any given systemic dis-
parate treatment case before the court. Consider the following
hypothetical case as an illustration. It is crucial to note that this hy-
pothetical application is an illustration only. The chief purpose is
to urge courts and policymakers to think about systemic disparate
treatment cases in these terms, and to substitute the proper figures
according to their beliefs and the available empirical information,
as well as the evidence submitted to them in a particular case.
In a systemic discrimination case, a class of female employees al-
leges that the defendant employer intentionally and systematically
discriminated against women in making promotions to manage-
ment positions. The court estimates that the prior probability of
unlawful discrimination (prob(X)) in this case is roughly .15, given
the historical data on success rates for Title VII discrimination
plaintiffs in cases reaching litigation.182
180. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 380 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 2004)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of employer because of weaknesses in statistical evi-
dence and lack of testimonial evidence regarding intentional discrimination, without
considering the possibility of asymmetries in access to information); EEOC v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment in favor of em-
ployer on pattern or practice disparate treatment age discrimination claim in the context of
a RIF due to weaknesses in statistical and testimonial evidence, without mentioning poten-
tial disparities in access to evidence on motivation for terminations).
182. If the court believes that these success rates are artificially skewed toward defend-
ants because of unwarranted procedural or other obstacles facing employment
discrimination plaintiffs, it may place the estimate of (prob(X)) closer to .5, making a
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In Phase I, both parties offer statistical evidence presented by
competing statistical experts. The court finds the statistical evi-
dence presented by plaintiffs to be more convincing because the
statistical model is better-designed. 8 3 Plaintiffs' statistical evidence
consists of a multiple regression analysis, using what the court de-
termines to be an appropriate set of independent variables. The
results show that the gender of an applicant for promotion was a
very strong predictor of whether the applicant received a promo-
tion, and the regression coefficient for gender is highly statistically
significant at the 5% level, meaning that it was not likely produced
by chance. Based on this statistical result, the court might reasona-
bly assume that (prob(Y|~X)) is probably .05 or less.18 4 The court
likewise reasons that (prob( YIX)) must be substantially higher than
(prob(Y-X), and therefore estimates (prob(YIX)) as .5.18 Plug-
ging these estimated values into the Hay and Spier formula, the
court should shift the burden to defendant if, and only if:
.5 x .15 x plaintiff's information costs > .05 x .85 x defendant's
information costs
which reduces to:
.075 x plaintiffs information costs > .0425 x defendant's in-
formation costs
and further reduces to:
1.76 x plaintiffs information costs > defendant's information
costs
stronger case for burden-shifting. On the other hand, if the court believes that the .15 win
rate overstates the percentage of Title VII claims brought to litigation that are actually meri-
torious, then it may arrive at a lower estimate of (prob(X)), weakening the case for burden-
shifting.
183. For the sake of simplicity, this illustration assumes a bench trial, where the court is
the factfinder. Whether a jury should be permitted to evaluate complex statistical evidence
of discrimination in Phase I of a pattern or practice case poses another question beyond the
scope of this Article. Studies suggest that judges and juries are equally poor at evaluating
complicated statistical evidence. See Andrew Jurs, judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge
Science in the Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategs, 42
CoNN. L. REV. 49, 73-75 (2009); Jennifer K Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries-by Comparison-to
judges: A Benchmark forjudging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 491-92 (2005).
184. On this point, the court should be careful to recognize that it is actually using
(prob( Ylrandom selection)) as a benchmark for estimating (prob(YI-X)).
185. The court is assuming that even where the employer actually does unlawfully dis-
criminate against females in handing out promotions a statistical analysis would reveal a
highly statistically significant result at the 5% level only about half of the time, and would
return a false negative about half of the time. This assumption is a reasonable one, accord-
ing to Dawson's calculations. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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In other words, given the court's estimates of probabilities, up-
dated in light of the statistical evidence presented at Phase I, the
court should leave the burdens of production and persuasion on
plaintiff only if it believes that the plaintiff has 1.76 times better ac-
cess to information (i.e., lower information costs) on the question
of discriminatory intent than the defendant. If the court believes
that the defendant actually has better access to information on the
element of discriminatory intent-the reasons for not promoting
any particular female applicant-then the court should shift the
burdens of production and persuasion onto defendant on that
point.
IV. APPLICATION To GROUPS OF CASES: RESOLVING UNCERTAINTIES
IN SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW
The usefulness of this theoretical framework is not necessarily
limited to resolving burden-shifting decisions in individual cases.
Policy makers and appellate courts can use the principles derived
herein to generalize about types of discrimination cases, in order
to make principled decisions about the proper reach of the Team-
sters systemic disparate treatment theory. To demonstrate,
reconsider the questions in pattern or practice doctrine outlined
in Part II.A., using the insights offered by the framework devel-
oped in this Article.
A. Age Discrimination
Should the Teamsters framework be available to plaintiffs in age
discrimination cases under the ADEA? Does it make sense as a pol-
icy matter to treat systemic age discrimination claims differently
than Title VII systemic race, sex, national origin, or religion
claims?
The theoretical framework developed above can guide this poli-
cy analysis. Is there any reason to think that the prior probability of
discrimination (prob(X)) is lower for age claims than it is for other
kinds of discrimination claims? Congress may have thought so.
186. In this Part, I consider the differences between cases like Teamsters and cases in-
volving age discrimination, disability discrimination, systemic harassment, or individual non-
class plaintiffs, and analyze whether those differences are relevant under the framework
developed in this Article. The discussion to follow assumes that legislators and courts (and
the reader) believe that Teamsters was correctly decided, and that shifting the burdens of
persuasion and production can be justified in appropriate systemic disparate treatment
cases.
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Before enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered
and rejected proposals to include older workers as a protected
group under Title VII.187 Instead, Congress requested that the Sec-
retary of Labor study the issue of age discrimination in
employment and provide a report.'.. The Secretary's report indi-
cated that there was little intentional discrimination against older
workers arising from dislike or intolerance of older people.' 9 Ra-
ther, the report found that some "arbitrary" age limitations could
result in age discrimination.'o The Supreme Court has noted that,
as a historical matter, "intentional discrimination on the basis of
age has not occurred at the same levels as discrimination against
those protected by Title VII." 9'
However, this may not necessarily equate to a significant differ-
ence in the prior probability (prob(X)) of unlawful discrimination
in cases reaching litigation. As discussed above, cases falling at either
extreme are likely to settle.192 A comparison between win rates for
ADEA plaintiffs in litigated cases versus win rates for litigated Title
VII cases may provide additional insight. In their most recent study
Clermont and Schwab found that ADEA plaintiffs actually had
higher win rates (11.67%) than Title VII plaintiffs (10.88%) for the
years 1998-2006.'" This suggests that, at least for cases reaching
litigation, the prior probability (prob(X)) for age discrimination is
likely not significantly different from (prob(X)) for the types of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Further empirical research
could shed more light on the relative prevalence of unlawful inten-
tional age discrimination in the workplace, as compared to other
types of discrimination.
Next, consider the type and quality of the evidentiary signal (the
statistical evidence) available in systemic age discrimination cases.
The types of statistical evidence offered in systemic age discrimina-
tion cases are generally the same as the types of statistical evidence
offered in race, sex, national origin, and religion cases-usually
consisting of either a binomial distribution analysis or a multiple
regression analysis, with the same inherent strengths and weak-
nesses that attend those statistical techniques. These statistical
187. 110 CONG. REc. 2596-99, 9911-13 (1964); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228,
232 n.2 (2005).
188. Smith, 544 U.S. at 232 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 715, 78 Star. 265).
189. Id. (citing Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Dis-
crimination in Employment 5 (June 1965), reninted in U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADEA (1981), Doc. No. 5).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 241; see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993).
192. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
193. See Clermont &Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 151, at 117.
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analyses can provide the same type of signal suggesting the exist-
ence of the discriminatory intent element. There is no reason to
think that (prob(YX)) or (prob(YI-X)) will be systematically dif-
. 194
ferent in age cases as compared with race or sex cases.
Finally, there is no apparent reason to believe that age discrimi-
nation cases are significantly different from other types of
discrimination cases on the parties' relative access to information
about discriminatory intent. It may be no easier for the victim of
age discrimination to learn the true reason for his termination
than it is for the victim of sex or race discrimination.1 9 5 As in Title
VII cases, the employer in an ADEA will have greater access to evi-
dence on the question of discriminatory intent than the plaintiff.
Applying the theoretical framework developed above, there is
no compelling policy reason to treat systemic disparate treatment
ADEA cases any differently than systemic disparate treatment Title
VII cases. From a policy perspective, courts should allow ADEA
plaintiffs to utilize the Teamsters burden-shifting method of proving
systemic disparate treatment. If necessary, the legislature should
amend the ADEA to resolve any textual ambiguity and make it
clear that the Teamsters framework is available in age cases.
B. Disability Discrimination
Should plaintiffs under the ADA be able to utilize the Teamsters
framework? Resolving this question is difficult, even with the
194. Age sometimes correlates with factors that may be legitimately considered by em-
ployers in making employment decisions. See generally Hazen Paper co., 507 U.S. at 611. Thus,
it could be argued that statistical evidence of age disparities in hiring or terminations might
seem to have less probative force than in the context of race or sex. But this argument ig-
nores two points. First, a well-modeled regression analysis can control for any quantifiable
legitimate variables that may correlate with age. Second, even if a regression analysis control
is impracticable in Phase I, the purpose of Phase II in a systemic disparate treatment case is
to permit the employer to demonstrate any legitimate factors that led to the adverse em-
ployment action suffered by any individual claimant-a question on which the employer has
superior access to information. Thus, burden-shifting on the basis of statistical evidence in
age discrimination cases furthers the policy purposes of systemic disparate treatment theory.
195. See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment
Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REv. 693, 713 (2000). There might, however, be
some reason to think that employers or their agents are somewhat less likely to hide their
true beliefs about older employees, and therefore more likely to create direct evidence of
discriminatory intent in age cases than in race or sex cases. See supra notes 187-191. If true,
this would mean that the parties' relative access to information on discriminatory intent is
marginally more symmetrical in age cases.
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benefit of the theoretical framework developed herein. 96 Nonethe-
less, the framework can help sharpen analysis of the question.
First, consider prior probabilities. Like age discrimination, there
may be some reason to believe that animus-based intentional dis-
crimination against disabled individuals in the workplace is
generally less prevalent than animus-based intentional discrimina-
tion based on race, sex, or national origin. 97 Narrowing the focus
to cases that reach litigation, however, there is less reason to be-
lieve that (prob(X)) is significantly different for disability cases
than for Title VII cases. Clermont and Schwab found win rates of
9.12% for ADA plaintiffs versus 10.88% for Title VII cases for the
years 1998-2006.
The second factor-the strength of the evidentiary signal-
poses the major hurdle to applying systemic disparate treatment
theory in ADA cases. Obtaining reliable estimates of (prob(Y|-X))
and (prob(YIX)) is substantially complicated by the definition of
unlawful discrimination under the ADA. Recall that (X) represents
not just discrimination, but unlawful discrimination-as defined by
the legal rule in question. The ADA prohibits "discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual with a disability."198 As the Hohider
court correctly explained, the ADA differs from Title VII in that it
does not categorically prohibit discrimination against any disabled
individuals, but rather only protects "qualified individuals with a
disability."
Presenting statistical evidence (IY) that gives some reliable indi-
cation of whether discrimination in violation of the ADA (X) has
occurred therefore poses a challenge. A binomial distribution or
regression analysis reflecting a disparity in an employer's hiring or
promotion of all disabled individuals, without any analysis of
whether those disabled individuals were "qualified individuals with
a disability" as defined by the ADA, does not give any reliable signal
(1) about whether the employer is acting in violation of the statute
(X). This is because the law recognizes that, unlike race, sex, or
196. This question will likely need to be resolved in the near future, because the EEOC
is currently exploring ways in which it can pursue more ADA cases as part of its Systemic
Initiative. See EEOC Transcript, supra note 12 (Testimony of Commissioner Christine M.
Griffin) ("And as I sit here thinking about that wonderful report and the remarks about
individual ADA cases versus Systemic, I was actually trying to think would that, would the
passage of that [ADA Restoration Act] create more of a Systemic opportunity within the
ADA versus what's traditionally been mostly individual cases.").
197. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (noting that discrimination
against the disabled is "most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather thought-
lessness and indifference . . . .").
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
199. See Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., 574 F.3d 169, 191 (3d Cir. 2009).
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national origin, in many cases a person's disability actually is rele-
vant to job decisions; the disability itself might be a legitimate
reason for taking an adverse employment action.
Few cases have considered the possible application of the Team-
sters doctrine in the ADA context.20 Indeed, in Hohider the court
noted that no federal court of appeals had directly addressed
whether or how the Teamsters framework might apply in ADA cas-
es.20' However, it might be possible to envision an observational
statistical study of an employer's workforce that could provide
some reliable indication of (prob(YI-X)) in a disability discrimi-
nation case. Perhaps a statistical study could be undertaken after
individual rulings are made (or agreements are reached) on
which employees or applicants included in the study meet the
statutory requirement as "qualified individuals with a disability."
In this hypothetical study, the independent variable in question
would not be simply "Disabled," but would be a more appropriate
independent variable that comports with the statutory require-
ment: "Qualified Individual with a Disability." However, no such
studies have yet been offered as statistical proof of systemic disa-
bility discrimination in the reported cases to date.2 o2
Finally, consider the parties' relative access to information on
the element of discriminatory intent. Again, evidence of the
employer's reasons for taking an adverse employment action is
generally in the hands of the employer. There is no apparent rea-
son to believe that information asymmetries on the element of
discriminatory intent are systematically different for disability cases
than for other types of discrimination.
The theoretical framework developed in this Article can assist
courts and policymakers in considering whether ADA plaintiffs
should be allowed to use the Teamsters systemic disparate treat-
ment method of proof. But the reported cases on systemic
200. In Hohider, the plaintiffs did not offer statistical proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination against the disabled. Instead, they argued that the defendant maintained
certain unwritten policies that resulted in systemic discrimination against the disabled. See
id. at 172 (plaintiffs alleged that UPS enforced an "unwritten policy, which prohibits em-
ployees from returning to UPS in any vacant position unless the employee can return to his
or her last position without any medical restrictions."). See supra note 168 for a discussion of
how testimonial evidence regarding unwritten employer policies of discrimination might be
evaluated as an evidentiary signal under the framework developed herein.
201. Hohider, 574 F.3d at 179 n.l.
202. Alternatively, a study might examine statistical disparities only with respect to the
termination of individuals who had been employed by defendant while disabled. The inde-
pendent variable in such a study would therefore naturally be confined to only those
disabled individuals whom the employer had already determined were qualified, with or
without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of their position. See
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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disability discrimination highlight the difficult challenge of obtain-
ing reliable evidentiary signals (prob(Y|~X)) for making accurate
judicial estimates of the probability of unlawful behavior sufficient
to justify burden-shifting. However, a more finely-tuned statistical
model that could closely track the "qualified individual with a disa-
bility" requirement of the ADA might offer a more reliable eviden-
evidentiary signal at Phase I, justifying burden-shifting in systemic
disability cases. Therefore, appellate courts and legislators should
not foreclose the potential application of the Teamsters method of
proof in appropriate ADA cases.
C. Hostile Work Environment
Should Teamsters be used to shift the burdens of production and
persuasion in systemic harassment cases? Applying the framework
developed herein, the answer should be no. In systemic harass-
ment cases, there are two major differences from ordinary Title VII
systemic discrimination cases: (1) a general inability to obtain reli-
able estimates of (prob(Y-X)) and (prob(YIX)) with statistical
evidence and (2) the lack of information asymmetries on the rele-
vant factual points at issue.
First, in systemic harassment cases the statistical evidence availa-
ble (if any) gives no reliable basis for estimating (prob(YI-X)) or
(prob(YIX)). The court has no reliable information with which to
update its estimate of the prior probability of unlawful harassment
(prob(X)). The only statistical evidence available in a systemic har-
assment case consists of the number of harassment complaints and
the distribution of those complaints, as well as the size and distri-
bution of the workforce.20 s But the number and distribution of
harassment complaints alone does not give a reliable indication
that unlawful harassment in violation of Title VII has occurred. A
complaint is just that-a charging party's expression that it believes
a violation has occurred. It does not provide the same "telltale
sign" of employer discrimination that a statistically significant dis-
parity in the distribution of hirings, firings, or promotions can
provide.
203. See, e.g., EEOC v. Carrols Corp., No. 5:98 CV 1772, 2005 WL 928634, at *2 n.4
(N.D.N.Y. April 20, 2005); see also Bent, supra note 10 at 176-77.
204. Some might contend that plaintiffs in a systemic harassment case can present non-
statistical evidence of either an express or unwritten policy of tolerating harassment in the
workplace, thereby providing the court with at least some information from which a rough
estimate of (prob(YI-X)) might be made. See supra note 168. Even if this is taken to be true,
other characteristics unique to hostile work environment law, discussed in the text immedi-
ately below, make estimation of (prob (Yj-X)) especially challenging.
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Further, like the "qualified individual with a disability" require-
ment of the ADA, the definition of an unlawful hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII contains intricacies not cap-
tured by the available statistical evidence. A plaintiff may indeed
have been harassed by a co-worker or supervisor, and might even
have complained about it, without an employer violating Title
VII. 0o' Usually plaintiffs in systemic harassment cases offer only a
series of anecdotal accounts of harassment and testimony about an
employer's inadequate responses to individual instances of harass-
ment. But these anecdotal accounts, even if taken as true, tell the
court very little about whether any other class member suffered
from harassment rising to the level of an objectively and subjective-
ly hostile work environment. As one district court put it: "[A] find-
finding that an employer had a pattern or practice of tolerating
sexual harassment in violation of Title VII does not necessarily es-
tablish than an individual claimant was exposed to harassment or
that the harassment an individual claimant suffered violates Title
VII."' In terms of the Hay and Spier model, where (1) consists
only of anecdotal testimony offered by other class members in
Phase I, then as to any other non-testifying class member there is
little reason to be confident that (prob(YIX)) is greater than
(prob(Y|~X)). Or, restated, the observation that several class
members testified in Phase I that they were exposed to an objec-
tively and subjectively hostile work environment does not tell the
court much about whether a different class member, who did not
testify in Phase I, was also exposed to a work environment that was
both objectively and subjectively hostile and abusive (i.e., whether
the employer acted unlawfully as to this particular individual). The
evidentiary signal from Phase I is weak.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, systemic harassment cases
do not present the same sort of asymmetrical access to evidence on
205. First, a plaintiff in a hostile work environment case must establish that the work
environment to which he was subjected was both objectively and subjective hostile. See Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Second, even if the plaintiff can show that he was
subjected to an objectively and subjectively hostile work environment due to harassment by a
supervisor, the employer has not violated Title VII if (1) the employer took reasonable pre-
ventative and corrective measures and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage
of the employer's preventative and corrective measures. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
For alleged harassment by a co-worker rather than a supervisor, the standard triggering
employer liability is even higher. The employer is liable for such conduct only if it was negli-
gent in failing to prevent the harassment. See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 95
(1st Cir. 2005); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2003); Hall
v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 2002). See generally Bent, supra note 10.
206. EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., No. 01 C 4427, 2007 WL 3120069, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
23, 2007).
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the disputed questions as do ordinary Title VII discrimination
cases. In the ordinary Title VII disparate treatment discrimination
case the key disputed factual question is discriminatory intent-
that is, whether the employer took adverse action against the plain-
tiff because of the plaintiff's sex, race, national origin, or religion.
The question of discriminatory intent is the question that presents
information asymmetries, and it is the fact upon which the Team-
sters burden-shift operates. The question of whether an individual
plaintiff suffered an adverse action is usually not disputed; it is
generally easy to determine whether the plaintiff was fired, not
hired, not promoted, or transferred, and the burden-shift is not
intended to assist in the resolution of that question. The burden-
shift operates on the question of the employer's discriminatory in-
tent in taking the adverse action based on (1) statistical evidence
suggesting a sufficiently high probability of discriminatory intent
and (2) because it is generally difficult for plaintiffs to find and
present evidence of that discriminatory intent.207
Whether the harassment directed at the plaintiff was because of
sex or race or some other protected characteristic is not usually the
critical issue in typical harassment cases. Rather, empirical evi-
dence suggests that the decisive issues in harassment cases are
more often: (1) whether the work environment to which the plain-
tiff was subjected rose to the level of subjectively and objectively
hostile and (2) whether the plaintiff took advantage of any reason-
able preventive and corrective measures the employer had in
place.208 These are both questions on which the plaintiff and de-
fendant have roughly equivalent access to the evidence. Inherently,
the plaintiff has personal knowledge of the work environment to
which she was subjected. And the plaintiff has personal knowledge
of any steps she took, such as making a complaint to her supervisor
or to the personnel department, to take advantage of the employ-
er's preventative and corrective measures. The key disputed facts in
harassment cases are about what happened to plaintiff (whether
she actually suffered an unlawful adverse action), not about what
motivated the adverse action. The access to information factor does
not favor burden-shifting in the context of systemic harassment
cases.
207. Seelnt'1 Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
208. See David J. Walsh, Small Change: An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supreme Court
Precedents on Federal Appeals Court Decisions in Sexual Harassment Cases, 30 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 461, 488, 492-503 (2009). Same sex harassment and "equal-opportunity harasser" cases
are the primary exceptions, and more frequently turn on questions of whether the harasser
had a discriminatory motive. Id. at 488.
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The framework developed in this Article shows that the Teamsters
pattern or practice method of proof is inappropriate for systemic
harassment cases. Two factors counsel against burden-shifting in
such cases: the weakness of the evidentiary signal offered in Phase
I, and the lack of information asymmetries on the key disputed
questions of fact.
D. Individual (Non-Class Action) Private Plaintiffs
Should individual employment discrimination plaintiffs have the
opportunity to use the Teamsters method of proof if they can pro-
duce convincing statistical evidence of discrimination, or should
they be limited to the weaker McDonnell Douglas framework? Apply-
ing the foregoing analysis, individual plaintiffs should be permitted
to use the Teamsters framework in appropriate cases, even though
the federal appellate courts have generally held to the contrary.
The only difference between an individual private discrimina-
tion claim involving statistical proof of a disparity and a class action
discrimination claim involving statistical evidence is that in a class
action the plaintiffs have satisfied the procedural requirements for
class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 . In the individual
private case, the individual has evidence of a systemic violation but
is litigating alone or with too few co-plaintiffs to satisfy the numer-
osity requirement.
Analyzing this situation using the theoretical framework devel-
oped here, there is no reason to treat the individual non-class
private plaintiffs any differently than class plaintiffs. There is no
principled reason to believe that (prob(X)) is any higher for any
given class claimant in a race discrimination class action than it is
for an individual race discrimination plaintiff, all else being equal.
Before considering the statistical evidence, the (prob(X)) for any
given type of discrimination is no different for an individual plain-
tiff than it is for a plaintiff who also happens to be a member of a
certified class. Nor is there any reason to believe that the infor-
mation asymmetries are any different. It is just as difficult, and
perhaps even more difficult, for an individual discrimination plain-
tiff to find and present evidence of an employer's true reasons for
209. These requirements include: (1) that the class is so numerous as to make joinder
of all members impracticable; (2) the existence of questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) that the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and (4) that the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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taking an adverse employment action as it is for plaintiffs who are
members of a certified class.
Finally, the evidentiary signal, (prob( YIX)) as compared to
(prob(Y|-X)), offered by a single plaintiff at Phase I can be just as
strong as the evidentiary signal offered by class plaintiffs. In fact,
there is no reason that an individual's statistical evidence need be
any different at all from what could be offered in a class action. It is
possible, for example, that an individual plaintiff in a sex discrimi-
nation case could obtain statistical evidence sufficient to support a
class action for failure to promote on the basis of sex, but that all
of her fellow female employees decline to sue their employer, for
reasons personal to them. The Phase I statistical evidence in the
individual case would be identical to the Phase I evidence that could
have been offered if it were a class action.
If an individual plaintiff can make a strong showing that
(prob(YIX)) is likely much higher than (prob(YI-X)) using statis-
tical evidence, just as in a class action systemic disparate treatment
case, then there is no principled reason why that individual should
not obtain the same benefit of a shift in the burden of persuasion,
rather than being relegated to the less powerful McDonnell Douglas
scheme. Requiring individual plaintiffs to proceed under the
McDonnell Douglas framework unjustifiably forces plaintiff to bear
the burden of persuasion at all times, despite the strength of the
statistical evidentiary signal. As shown by the analysis developed
above, there is no policy reason to preclude individual plaintiffs
from using the systemic disparate treatment theory.
CONCLUSION
Systemic disparate treatment theory is in disarray. The EEOC's
current emphasis on systemic discrimination cases makes it imper-
ative to devise a principled approach to systemic disparate
treatment cases. Traditional burden allocation considerations, as
well as the Teamsters opinion itself, suggest that estimates of proba-
bilities and the parties' relative access to information should play
an important role in determining how the systemic disparate
treatment theory is applied. The use of Bayesian probability in the
Hay and Spier model allows us to think even more rigorously about
how burdens should be allocated in systemic disparate treatment
cases. Drawing upon that model, this Article identifies the three
key factors for determining whether to permit an inference of dis-
criminatory intent under the systemic disparate treatment theory:
(1) the prior probability (or estimated prevalence) of discrimina-
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tion; (2) the relative strength of the evidentiary signal observed in
Phase I of the case; and (3) the asymmetries in the parties' access
to evidence on the point at issue.
Courts can make more informed judgments about whether an
inference of discriminatory intent is appropriate in any particular
systemic discrimination case by analyzing systemic disparate treat-
ment cases through the lens of this theoretical foundation. This
foundation will assist courts in considering the weight of statistical
evidence and avoiding statistical fallacies by being mindful of the
importance of estimates of prior probabilities. The broader effects
and applications of this approach will not just serve to remind
courts of the importance of information asymmetries and prior
probabilities, but should also guide policymakers in defining the
appropriate contours of the systemic disparate treatment theory.
